Essays in international trade and development by Maio, Michael
Essays in International Trade and Development
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
BY
Michael Maio
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
TIMOTHY KEHOE AND FABRIZIO PERRI
JULY, 2014
c© Michael Maio 2014
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Acknowledgements
I owe a debt of gratitude to many people for the role they played in helping me obtain a
Ph.D. Timothy Kehoe and Fabrizio Perri have provided invaluable guidance as advisers.
Jim Schmitz supported me as his research assistant at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis and taught me never to accept data at face value, and to always try to
understand at a deep level how it is created. Enoch Hill and David Perez-Reyna, my
co-authors on the second chapter, have been great colleagues and friends, and our essay
would not have been possible without them. All of the participants in the University of
Minnesota Trade and Development Workshop from 2010-2014 patiently listened to me
present my research about 9,000 times and provided considered feedback. The comments
and suggestions provided by Thomas Holmes, Cristina Arellano, Arilton Teixeira, and
Jose Asturias also deserve to be singled out.
i
Dedication
For my parents, Douglas and Mary Maio.
ii
Abstract
In the fields of international trade and economic development, the behaviors of in-
dividual firms are often at the center of attention. What unites the essays in this thesis
is their focus on studying the aggregate effects of individual firm decisions. Chapter
2 demonstrates that pressure from foreign competition can reduce managerial slack in
domestic firms, and that this was a substantial source of productivity gains in Chile
following the country’s unilateral trade liberalization in the 1970s. Chapter 3 demon-
strates theoretically how firms’ choices of organizational structure lead to the high skill
premium seen among large firms. Finally, in Chapter 4, I show that in an environment
where firm market power differs across industries, firm technological upgrading decisions
amplify market distortions and increase allocative inefficiency.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The essays in this thesis fall broadly within the fields of international trade and economic
development. In both fields, the behaviors of individual firms are often at the center
of attention, and what unites the essays in this thesis is their focus on studying the
aggregate effects of individual firm decisions.
Firms in import-competing industries often experience substantial productivity growth
following unilateral trade liberalization episodes. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that a
firm’s ownership structure plays an important role in understanding the relationship be-
tween foreign competition and firm productivity growth. The central idea is that foreign
competition leads to productivity gains in firms with separate ownership and manage-
ment by reducing moral hazard. That is, foreign competition reduces managerial slack. I
develop and calibrate a model to study this mechanism, and the mitigation of principal-
agent frictions emerges as a quantitatively important source of productivity gains among
firms in import-competing industries. When applied to Chile’s unilateral tariff reduction
in the 1970s, the model accounts for 69 percent of the difference in average productivity
growth between plants in import-competing industries and those in non-traded goods
industries. The model also accounts for the fact that, in Chile’s import-competing in-
dustries, plants with separate ownership and management had much higher productivity
growth than owner-managed plants.
Chapter 3 is co-written with Enoch Hill and David Perez-Reyna. In it, we propose
an original model of firm hierarchy which suggests that a firm’s organizational structure
is important for understanding its wage structure. In our model, more productive firms
1
2choose to employ more levels of management, which requires a higher average level of
skill in workers and consequently a higher average skill premium. This is consistent
both with our findings from a Chilean firm-level data set and also with the positive
relationship between firm size and skill premium documented in the literature. Addi-
tionally, our model predicts that skill premium is increasing in the ratio of workers to
managers, a fact we also observe in the Chilean data.
In Chapter 4, I step outside the trade context of Chapter 2 and study theoretically
the relationship between product market competition and innovation in a general equi-
librium environment in which different industries have different levels of competitiveness,
as measured by the number of producers. In particular, I develop a model to study how
firm technological upgrading decisions affect allocative efficiency in a multi-industry en-
vironment where market concentration differs across industries. I conduct numerical
simulations for a range of empirically relevant parameters, and I find that technological
upgrading increases the allocative inefficiency that results from differences in market
power across industries. Firms in industries with a low number of producers and high
market concentration do not upgrade their productive technology, while firms in more
competitive industries do. Resources then shift away from industries that are already
producing too few goods relative to the socially optimal level. Allocative inefficiency
increases. Once that firm upgrading decisions are taken into account, the efficiency
losses from differences in market concentration become even larger.
Chapter 2
Foreign Competition and Firm
Productivity: A Principal-Agent
Approach
2.1 Introduction
Many empirical studies show that firms in import-competing industries often experience
substantial productivity growth following a unilateral trade liberalization. When tariffs
fall, domestic firms face increased competitive pressure from abroad, and many respond
by raising their productivities.1 In this essay, I demonstrate both theoretically and em-
pirically that a firm’s ownership structure plays an important role in understanding the
relationship between firm productivity growth and import pressure. Using a plant-level
manufacturing dataset from Chile, I document that plants with separate ownership
and management (e.g., corporations) in import-competing industries had high aver-
age productivity growth following the country’s unilateral tariff reduction in the 1970s.
Meanwhile, owner-managed plants (e.g., sole proprietorships) in import-competing in-
dustries did not. Existing theories of trade and firm-level productivity growth ignore
ownership structure, but the data call for a theory that does not.
1The growing list of countries where this phenomenon has been documented includes Chile (Pavcnik
2002), Colombia (Fernandes 2007), India (Sivadasan 2009), and Brazil (Muendler 2004).
3
4The central theoretical idea of this paper is that foreign competition leads to produc-
tivity gains in firms with separate ownership and management by ameliorating moral
hazard. Put simply, foreign competition reduces managerial slack. I develop and cal-
ibrate a model to study this mechanism, and the mitigation of principal-agent fric-
tions emerges as a quantitatively important source of productivity gains among firms
in import-competing industries.
The model is also consistent with the high productivity growth seen in Chilean
import-competing industries among plants with separate ownership and management,
relative to owner-managed plants. In my model, some firms are owner-managed and
some have separate ownership and management. Managers of all firms (regardless of
ownership type) work harder to raise productivity when foreign competition threatens
the firm’s survival. The reason is that they value their jobs and do not want to lose them.
A critical point is that the effect of competition on managerial effort is much stronger in
the presence of moral hazard. Increased foreign competition leads to high productivity
growth in firms with separate ownership and management largely by relieving principal-
agent frictions. In owner-managed firms, where there is no managerial slack, there is
less scope for productivity gains.
In my model, the fear of bankruptcy leads to productivity improvements. By con-
trast, the standard explanation for why trade liberalization leads to firm-level pro-
ductivity growth involves scale economies. Prominent examples include Costantini and
Melitz (2007), Lileeva and Trefler (2010), and Bustos (2011). Their models are designed
to study productivity growth among exporting firms following bilateral liberalizations,
but they are not appropriate for studying unilateral liberalizations. They would predict
that a unilateral fall in tariffs would decrease rather than increase productivity growth
among firms in import-competing industries. The logic of scale economies is as follows.
As trade barriers fall bilaterally, exporting firms sell a larger quantity of goods in for-
eign markets, which increases the gains associated with productivity improvements and
therefore leads to productivity growth. Scale economies cannot explain why firms in
import-competing industries see productivity growth following unilateral liberalizations,
though: their sales shrink rather than increase.
As mentioned above, there is need for a theory that not only captures productivity
gains in import-competing industries, but also captures differences by ownership type.
5The differences in the Chilean data are quite large. During the period of adjustment to
Chile’s unilateral tariff reduction in the late 1970s, plants in import-competing indus-
tries experienced productivity growth that was 8.9 percentage points higher on average
than plants in non-traded goods industries. One contribution of my paper is to show
that most of the difference can be attributed to high productivity growth among the
plants in import-competing industries that I categorize as having principal-agent fric-
tions. More precisely, I divide plants into two groups based on ownership type. One
group, which I classify as managerial plants, consists of plants with separate ownership
and management. These are the plants aﬄicted by principal-agent frictions. Corpora-
tions account for the largest share of managerial plants in the data. The other group,
entrepreneurial plants, consists of plants in sole proprietorships or partnerships, where
there is no separation between ownership and management.
Managerial plants in import-competing industries have average productivity growth
16.5 percentage points higher than plants in non-traded industries (of either ownership
type). Meanwhile, entrepreneurial plants in import-competing industries have average
productivity growth that is roughly the same as plants in non-traded industries. Within
non-traded industries, there is no statistically significant difference in average produc-
tivity growth between ownership types. The results suggest that competitive pressure
leads to productivity gains in part by alleviating principal-agent frictions in firms with
separate ownership and management.
To investigate the extent to which the reduction of principal-agent frictions in firms
can explain the high average productivity growth seen in import-competing industries,
I nest a moral hazard problem in a multi-industry heterogeneous firm trade model.
The model borrows elements from Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and, in
addition, contains both entrepreneurial and managerial firms. I model entrepreneurial
firms as sole proprietorships whose owner-managers receive all firm profits. Managers
of managerial firms receive a share of profits agreed to through a contract with the firm
owners.
Managers of all firms can raise productivity by a fixed amount by exerting effort.
Exerting more effort increases the probability that the manager successfully raises pro-
ductivity. Managers also receive a non-pecuniary benefit from running their firms.
When the survival of a firm is threatened by a foreign competitor, the non-pecuniary
6benefit serves as an incentive for exerting effort to raise productivity and keep the firm
profitable. Even though foreign competition reduces the demand for a firm’s good -
and therefore the pecuniary rewards from raising productivity - the threat of losing
the non-pecuniary benefit can induce a manager to exert greater effort following the
increase in foreign competition. In this way, the “bankruptcy effect” of competition on
productivity more than offsets the standard scale effect.
Owners and managers in managerial firms face a standard moral hazard problem
in the class of problems studied in Sappington (1982). The two parties, who are both
risk-neutral, cannot form a contract that induces the manager to exert effort at the first-
best level because of a limited liability constraint on the manager. The contract that
induces the manager to exert effort at the first-best level requires the manager to receive
negative payments when productivity is low, which I do not allow. Managers therefore
slack and exert effort below the first-best level when ownership and management are
separate.
In the model’s import-competing industry, as in the data, managerial firms see higher
average productivity growth than entrepreneurial firms. The reason is that managers of
entrepreneurial firms, who internalize all the pecuniary gains from raising productivity,
exert effort at a high level even before tariffs fall. Because the disutility of effort is
convex, it is highly costly for them to increase their effort levels even further once
foreign competition increases. In managerial firms, which have separate ownership and
management, managers slack when faced with little competitive pressure. As a result,
they can exert more effort at comparatively little cost in response to increased foreign
competition.
When applied to Chile’s trade reforms, the model accounts for most of the differ-
ence in average productivity growth between plants in import-competing industries and
plants in non-traded industries. I calibrate the model to data from Chile and simulate
the country’s tariff reduction. I find that the difference in average productivity growth
between the model’s import-competing industry and the model’s non-traded industry is
6.1 percent. In the data, the figure is 8.9 percent, so the mechanism I study can account
for 69 percent of the difference in average growth.
The model also generates quantitatively important differences in productivity growth
by ownership type in the import-competing industry. In the data, import-competing
7managerial plants have average productivity growth 16.5 percentage points higher than
import-competing entrepreneurial plants. In the model, the difference is 5.6 percentage
points. The lessening of principal-agent frictions in the model therefore accounts for
34 percent of the difference in average productivity growth between the two ownership
types in the data. Hence the reduction of principal-agent frictions is an important
contributor to the high productivity growth seen among import-competing managerial
plants. In both the model and the data, differences in productivity growth between
both managerial and entrepreneurial producers of non-traded products are negligible.
I also use the model to analyze the aggregate effects of foreign competition on man-
agerial effort. The policy simulation in the model leads to a 1.6 percent increase in
real income. Of the 1.6 percent increase, 0.3 percentage points are attributable to the
alleviation of principal-agent frictions, so inefficiencies due to moral hazard problems
within firms represent a quantifiable and economically meaningful source of aggregate
loss. Removing trade barriers serves to reduce the losses from principal-agent frictions
by aligning the incentives of owners and managers more closely.
The model in this paper is not the only one to focus on the effects of foreign com-
petition on the productivities of import-competing firms. Holmes and Schmitz (2001)
show that when firms face foreign competitors, they may invest resources into raising
productivity rather than using resources to block the innovative activities of domes-
tic competitors. In the trapped factor model of Bloom, Romer, Terry, and Van Reenen
(2013), greater competitive pressure from low-wage countries induces firms in high-wage
countries to shift resources away from producing “old goods” and toward innovation.
Others studies, such as Holmes, Levine, and Schmitz (2012), examine the theoretical
effect of competition on productivity in environments that do not explicitly include
international trade, but their key ideas could be extended to explain why foreign com-
petition leads import-competing firms to raise productivity. I view the above studies as
being complementary to mine. My paper differs in that I am able to address the rela-
tionship between ownership structure and productivity growth that I see in the Chilean
data.
The principal-agent problem at the heart of my model borrows from a well-established
literature on moral hazard. As in Harris and Raviv (1979), the incentive problem be-
tween the manager and owners arises from the fact that it is costly for the manager to
8exert unobservable effort to raise productivity, but that owners are indifferent to the
manager’s level of effort, all else equal. Schmidt (1997) and Raith (2003) investigate the
theoretical effect of increased product market competition on managerial effort in set-
tings with moral hazard and show conditions under which increased competition leads to
increased effort. The form of the principal-agent problem in my model is closely related
to the problem considered in Schmidt (1997), although Schmidt’s analysis considers
a partial equilibrium environment with no international trade. In contrast to previ-
ous work, my paper presents a calibrated model with international trade and evaluates
the quantitative importance of principal-agent frictions in explaining the relationship
between foreign competition and productivity growth.
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model, and Section
2.3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 2.4 provides evidence from Chile in support of
the model’s main mechanism. Section 2.5 describes the calibration strategy and presents
the main quantitative results of the paper. Section 2.6 quantifies the role of principal-
agent frictions in the model and discusses the results, and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Model
Here I present a two-country, multi-industry model with heterogenous firms that can be
used to study firm productivity dynamics following Chile’s trade liberalization. Similar
to Bernard, Eaton, Jenson, and Kortum (2003), there is a continuum of imperfectly
substitutable traded products, and the producer of a particular traded product competes
head-to-head with a foreign producer of the same product. Additionally, each country
has a continuum of non-traded products, which are produced by firms that behave as
monopolists. The main theoretical innovation is to embed a principal-agent problem
within a heterogeneous-firm trade model. Firms are operated by managers who can
raise the productivity of a firm by exerting effort. The firms’ owners (principals) use
performance incentives to induce the managers to exert effort, and as we will see, a
manager will exert a high level of effort if doing so will prevent the firm from shutting
down.
92.2.1 Environment
There are two countries, denoted by h and f . The labor supplies are Lh and Lf ,
respectively. I assume Lf >> Lh, so the home country is much smaller than the foreign
country. I also assume that the home country is too small to affect aggregate equilibrium
quantities in the foreign country, but it still faces a downward-sloping foreign demand
curve for its products. In the quantitative analysis, Chile will play the role of the small
home country, while the large foreign country will represent the rest of the world. In
each country there are three industries, a non-traded industry and two traded industries.
Within each country i and industry k there is a mass Mik of firms in operation, each of
which produces a differentiated product. Let the industries be indexed by k ∈ {N, I,E}.
The letters will stand for “non-traded,” “import-competing,” and “export-oriented.”
As will be discussed further below, the two traded industries are distinguished by
the productivity distributions from which firms in the two industries draw. Capturing a
notion of Ricardian comparative advantage in the model, domestic firms in the export-
oriented industry draw from a productivity distribution that has a high mean compared
to the distribution from which foreign firms in the same industry draw. Meanwhile,
domestic firms in the import-competing industry draw from a productivity distribution
with a lower mean than their foreign counterparts.
Firms in the non-traded industry also draw from an industry-specific productivity
distribution. The non-traded industry should be thought of as representing manufac-
turing industries, such as concrete, in which transportation costs are so high that the
volume of international trade is negligible. Rather than explicitly allowing transporta-
tion costs to vary by industry in the model, I simply impose that products produced in
the non-traded industry cannot cross the international border.
All producers of traded products engage in head-to-head competition with a foreign
producer. That is, each producer of a traded product faces competition from a single
foreign foreign firm that produces a perfectly substitutable product. Consumers in each
location have linear preferences over a final good, which is a CES aggregate of the
differentiated products. Preferences in the home country are given by
ch =
(
MhN
∫ 1
0
qhN (j)
σ−1
σ dj +MI
∫ 1
0
(qhhI(j) + qhfI(j))
σ−1
σ dj +ME
∫ 1
0
(qhhE(j) +
qhfE(j))
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
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Here, qhN (j) is the quantity of non-traded product j consumed in the home country.
The term qhhk(j) represents the quantity of the jth product in traded industry k that
is produced in the home country and consumed at home, and qhfk(j) represents the
quantity of the jth product in traded industry k that is produced abroad and consumed
at home. Note that the masses of firms in the traded industries are not indexed by
location, i. That is because each traded product is produced by exactly one firm in each
location. Preferences in the foreign country are defined similarly, but with MfN >>
MhN . This assumption will make the traded industries negligibly small relative to the
foreign country’s non-traded industry, consistent with the home country being small. I
will also keep the ratio of (potential) firms to workers the same in each location:
MhN +MhI +MhE
Lh
=
MfN +MfI +MfE
Lf
To avoid redundancy, the exposition of the rest of the model will be done from the
home country’s perspective. Standard arguments yield the following inverse demand
functions:
phk(j) = Ph
( ch
qhk(j)
) 1
σ
(2.1)
where the ideal price index Ph is given by
Ph =
(
MhN
∫ 1
0
phN (j)
1−σdj +MI
∫ 1
0
phI(j)
1−σdj +ME
∫ 1
0
phE(j)
1−σdj
) 1
1−σ
The price phk(j) is the price charged to a consumer in the home country for product j
in industry k, and qhk(j) is the total quantity consumed of that product. (Note that
qhk(j) = qhhk(j) + qhfk(j) in traded industries.) Ph is the price of the final good ch.
2.2.2 Production
Each firm produces output with a linear labor-only technology with idiosyncratic labor
productivity zhk(j), which is drawn from a country- and industry-specific distribution
Ghk. Draws are i.i.d., and the draws of head-to-head competitors are uncorrelated.
Additionally, a firm in the home country faces an iceberg transportation cost Dhf of
selling goods in the foreign market. In order to study unilateral reductions in trade
11
barriers, I allow the iceberg cost of selling to the foreign country to differ from the
iceberg cost faced by foreign firms selling to the home country. That is, I will consider
cases with Dhf 6= Dfh, where Dfh is the iceberg cost faced by foreign firms selling to
the home country. The technology of a home country producer is summarized by
qhhk(j) = zhk(j)`hhk(j) (2.2)
qhfk(j) =
zhk(j)`hfk(j)
Dhf
(2.3)
The firm demands `hhk(j) + `hfk(j) units of production labor, which are compensated
with a wage wh.
It is worth emphasizing here that a firm in the import-competing industry may ex-
port if it receives an unusually high productivity draw. Meanwhile, a firm in the export-
oriented industry may find itself usurped in the home market by a foreign competitor
if it receives a sufficiently low productivity draw. The two industries are distinguished
by their average productivity draws, so the export-oriented industry will have a high
proportion of exporters compared to the import-competing industry.
2.2.3 Managers
Firms are owned collectively by all agents. In order to operate, each home country firm
must hire a single manager. Managers, who are identical, are drawn from a pool of
mass Nh ⊂ Lh and randomly matched with a firm.2 Managers cannot switch firms but
retain the option of working as production laborers instead. If they remain with their
firms, they receive a share of profits specified by a contract to be discussed below.
Each manager has two roles. The first is to choose the firm’s output level and
price given zhk(j). As will become evident later, managers always choose the profit-
maximizing quantities given z because their compensation increases with the firm’s
profits. The manager’s second role - and the one that is most important in the model -
is to influence the firm’s productivity level by exerting effort. By exerting effort e(z, ρ),
the manager of a firm with an initial productivity draw of z can raise productivity to
2I assume that Nh is large enough that the number of firms in operation is not constrained by the
supply of managers.
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∆z (where ∆ > 1) with probability ρ. The parameter ∆ is a fixed quantity given by
nature. Managerial effort only affects ρ.
In what ways can a manager influence productivity? In this paper, I view the
potential productivity gains embodied in ∆ primarily as the one-time implementation
of best business practices. Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2011) find evidence that
European firms raised productivity in response to increased import competition from
China following the country’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001. They
show that one contributor to productivity growth was the adoption of improved business
practices.3 Schmitz (2005) highlights a related mechanism through which competition
leads to productvitiy gains. He finds that competitive pressure from Brazilian iron ore
producers induced American producers to abandon inefficient work rules bargained for
by labor unions. While the increased competition made unions more willing to accept
the changes, it also presumably made management more willing to exert effort to take
on the unions. Finally, Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) find evidence that managers
incur private costs when making investment decisions on behalf of firms, leading to
underinvestment in technologies that raise productivity. Although the model here does
not include capital or R&D goods, the main insights could be extended readily to a
model that includes a managerial investment decision.
In the model, foreign firms do not have managers, and their productivities are given
by their initial draws. The assumption that foreign firms cannot raise their productivi-
ties means that the model will not be able to capture any possible strategic interactions
between the managers of two head-to-head competitors. While that is a potentially
interesting area for future research, it is beyond the scope of this paper. Here I will
assume that the firms in the rest of the world have already been subject to sufficient
market discipline that they have little room for further gains by the time they compete
with the home country firms.
Throughout this paper, I will let the function relating effort to productivity gains
take the following form:
e(z, ρ) = Azσ−1exp(bρ) (2.4)
3In Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), the authors survey firms on their management practices related
to, for example, incentive provision and monitoring. They find that the ones they deem to be “better
business practices” are positively correlated with firm outcomes such as profits and productivity.
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where A > 0 is a scaling parameter and b > 0 governs the curvature of e with respect
to ρ. Effort is increasing in the initial productivity draw z, so it is more difficult for
the manager of a highly productive firm to raise z by a factor of ∆ than it is for the
manager of a less-productive firm to do so. The effort function is also increasing and
convex in the choice of ρ. The above functional form is the same as the one used in
Atkeson and Burstein (2010), except that in their model R&D labor, not managerial
effort, raises productivity. As will be discussed in Section 2.5.1, setting the curvature
parameter on z equal to σ − 1 makes the manager’s effort decision homothetic in z for
non-traded firms, so that all non-traded firms in a particular location will have the same
probability ρ of having the manager’s efforts be successful. Since size and productivity
are perfectly correlated in the model, Gibrat’s Law holds for producers of non-traded
products.4
Finally, a manager enjoys a non-pecuniary benefit λzσ−1 from working as a manager
at the firm, where z is the firm’s initial productivity draw. The benefit can be thought
of as job perquisites, or private benefits that managers receive from controlling the
firm. The manager’s benefit increases in the firm’s initial productivity z, capturing the
idea that the manager of a large, highly productive organization enjoys more benefits
than the manager of a smaller, less-productive organization. I assume that firm owners
cannot affect the manager’s perks. The benefit λzσ−1 can be thought of as capturing the
prestige of being the boss, political influence, or other rewards that do not directly use
firm resources. The curvature parameter on z is set equal to σ − 1 for the same reason
that it is set to σ − 1 in the effort function: Doing so makes the manager’s choice of ρ
invariant to a firm’s initial productivity draw if the firm is a producer of a non-traded
product.
Later I will add to the model a type of firm that is owned solely by its manager. Doing
so will allow me to study the quantitative effect of ownership structure on productivity
growth. Managers of the manager-owned firms have the same perks and the same
opportunity to raise productivity as the managers who do not own their firms, and they
4The same will not be true for producers of traded products because the efforts of the managers of
these firms will depend on how productive the firms are relative to their foreign competitors. However,
the effort decisions of managers of traded firms will be homothetic in the following sense: A manager of
a firm with productivity z facing a competitor with productivity z∗ will choose the same value of ρ as
the manager of a firm with productivity αz facing a foreign firm with productivity αz∗, where α > 0.
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face the same potential threats from foreign competitors. The only difference is that
managers who own their own firms receive all of the firm’s profits rather than just a
share. The logic of the model extends readily to cover manager-owned firms, so they
will not be discussed again in this section.
2.2.4 Firm profits
In the next subsection, I discuss the optimal profit-sharing contract between owners
and managers, which will govern the choice of managerial effort. But for now, take
the ex-post distributions of productivities as given. (That is, suppose the outcomes of
managers’ efforts are already known.) At this point it is convenient to identify a firm
by its idiosyncratic productivity z and drop the index j.
Producers of non-traded products
Given productivity z, the manager of a firm that produces a non-traded product chooses
output produced for the home market to maximize profits pihN (z):
Max pihN (z) = phN (z)qhN (z)− wh`hN (z)
z
s.t. inverse demand function (1), production function (2)
The producer’s price is a constant markup over marginal cost:
phN (z) =
( σ
σ − 1
)(wh
z
)
(2.5)
Variable profits are then given by
pihN (z) =
( 1
σ
)(σ − 1
σ
)σ−1
P σh ch
( z
wh
)σ−1
(2.6)
Producers of traded products
The two producers of a particular traded product (one domestic, one foreign) are
Bertrand competitors. Since they produce the same product, the producer who supplies
the product at the lowest price in a particular location captures the entire market for
the product in that location. By standard arguments, the producer that can supply a
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location at the lowest unit cost will capture the entire market and will set a price equal
to either the competitor’s marginal cost (that is, it will limit-price) or the monopoly
price, whichever is lower. For example, suppose a home country firm has productivity z
and its foreign competitor has productivity z∗. Also suppose that wh/z < (Dfhwf )/z∗,
so that the home firm has the lowest unit cost in its home market. The home firm
captures the home market and sets the price equal to
phk(z, z
∗) = min
{( σ
σ − 1
)(wh
z
)
,
(Dfhwf
z∗
)}
(2.7)
Note that in the traded industries it is necessary to index the price by the productivities
of both the home producer and the foreign producer. A home country producer that
captures the home market and sets the monopoly price will earn profits in the home
market equal to
pihhk(z, z
∗) =
( 1
σ
)(σ − 1
σ
)σ−1
P σh ch
( z
wh
)σ−1
(2.8)
And if it behaves as a limit-pricer in its home market, it will earn home-market profits
equal to
pihhk(z, z
∗) =
[
φσ−1h − φσh
]
P σh ch
( z
wh
)σ−1
(2.9)
where φh is the ratio of the home and foreign firms’ unit labor costs for supplying the
home market:
φh ≡
(wh
z
)/(Dfhwf
z∗
)
.
If the home firm is also the lowest-cost producer in the foreign market and can set the
monopoly price abroad, its profits from selling abroad will be
pihfk(z, z
∗) =
( 1
σ
)(σ − 1
σ
)σ−1
P σf cf
( z
Dhfwh
)σ−1
(2.10)
And finally, if the home firm sells abroad and sets the limit price in the foreign market,
its profits from selling abroad will be
pihfk(z, z
∗) =
[
φσ−1f − φσf
]
P σf cf
( z
Dhfwh
)σ−1
(2.11)
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where φf is the ratio of the home and foreign firms’ unit labor costs for supplying the
foreign market:
φf ≡
(Dhfwh
z
)/(wf
z∗
)
.
For a home country firm in traded industry k with productivity z, total profits are
given by the sum of profits earned in each location: pihk(z, z
∗) = pihhk(z, z∗)+pihfk(z, z∗).
Not all producers of traded products can produce profitably. The home firm will not be
the low-cost producer in either location and will shut down if
z
wh
<
z∗
Dfhwf
The outcome of head-to-head Bertrand competition between a home firm and its
foreign rival can be summarized in the following definition.
Definition 1. Let the home producer’s productivity z, the foreign producer’s produc-
tivity z∗, and wages be given. A Bertrand equilibrium in country j consists of quantities
(qhjk(z, z
∗),qfjk(z, z∗)) and prices pjk(z, z∗) such that
(a) pjk(z, z
∗) is equal to the low-cost producer’s monopoly price or the high-cost
producer’s marginal
cost, whichever is lower (see equation 7);
(b) The high-cost producer in a particular location produces a quantity of zero for
that location;
(c) The low-cost producer in a particular location produces a quantity for that lo-
cation given by the
inverse demand function (1).
Three categories of non-traded firms
A firm may fall into one of three categories: thriving, struggling, or out. A firm is an
out firm if it would not be able to produce profitably even if the manager’s efforts to
raise productivity were successful. Out firms have such low productivities compared
to their foreign competitors that they would still be the high-cost producer in each
location if their productivities were raised by a factor ∆. Thriving firms are those that
are the low-cost producers in at least one location even when their managers fail to raise
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productivity. Thriving firms never shut down.5 Finally, struggling firms are those that
are the low-cost producer in at least one location only when the manager’s efforts to
raise productivity are successful. If their managers fail to rise productivity, then they
succumb to foreign competition and do not operate.
2.2.5 Contracting problem
Events within a firm unfold as follows. A firm receives its initial productivity draw,
which is public knowledge, and is matched with a manager. Managers are risk-neutral.
The firm’s owners and the manager negotiate a contract specifying payments to each
party contingent on profits. Profits can be either high or low depending on whether
or not the manager successfully raises productivity. Owners choose the contract that
maximizes their own expected payments, subject to a participation constraint for the
manager. Because the manager can choose to work as a production laborer, owners
must offer the manager a contract that provides expected utility greater than or equal
to the utility that can be gained from earning wage wh. If the owners do not satisfy
the manager’s participation constraint, the firm shuts down, and the manager returns
to the labor force to earn wage wh. Also, there are limited liability constraints for both
parties: neither the owner nor the manager may receive a negative share of profits in
any state. Once the owners and the manager agree on a contract, the manager then
exerts effort, and productivity gains (if any) are realized. The manager then chooses
the quantity of the firm’s product to produce for the domestic and foreign markets, and
profits are earned and distributed to each party.
The principal-agent friction in the model arises from the fact that effort is not
contractible. If firms could make payments contingent on effort, they could always
induce managers to exert effort at the first-best level. Instead, payments are contingent
on profits, which imperfectly reflect managerial effort because of the probabilistic nature
of productivity gains. The moral hazard problem between owners and managers belongs
to the class of problems studied in Sappington (1983). With risk-neutral owners and
managers, there exists under certain conditions a profit-sharing contract that induces
the manager to exert effort at the first-best level, but such a contract would require
the manager to receive a negative payment in the low-profit state. As in Sappington,
5Unless they cannot satisfy the manager’s participation constraint (see below).
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the limited liability constraints in my model prevent such contracts from being formed,
leading managers to exert effort at an inefficiently low level.6
The optimal contracting problem will take a separate form for each category of
traded firm - thriving, struggling, and out. For firms that are “out,” the problem
is trivial: no contract is ever formed because the firm shuts down immediately upon
learning its own productivity and the productivity of its competitor. It is as if firms
that are out never existed. The contracting problem for a struggling firm will differ
from that of a thriving firm in that the managers and owners of a struggling firm take
into account the fact that the manager will lose the benefit λzσ−1 if the manager fails
to raise productivity. Note that we can consider producers of non-traded products to be
“thriving.” Having no foreign competitors, producers of non-traded products are never
threatened with the possibility of being forced to shut down if productivity is not raised.
Optimal contract for thriving firms
First consider the optimal contract for thriving firms. Denote by piH and piL the values
that profits take when the manager raises productivity and when the manager does not
raise productivity. We will have piH > piL. To keep things simple in this section, the
dependence of piH and piL on z (and other parameters) is left implicit in the notation.
7 A
contract is a pair s = (sH , sL), which represents the profit shares to be received by the
manager when profits are high and when they are low. Since owners receive the portion
of profits left over after the manager is paid, owners receive the payment (1-sH)piH when
profits are high and (1-sL)piL when profits are low.
Managers are risk neutral and, given their contracts, choose their levels of effort to
maximize their expected incomes, less the disutility of effort. Equivalently, the man-
ager’s problem is to choose the utility-maximizing probability of success ρ∗:
6As Harris and Raviv (1979) show, in environments such as the one considered here where owners and
managers are both risk-neutral, the moral hazard problem could be eliminated by having the manager
become the residual claimant to firm profits after making a lump-sum payment to the owners. However,
I assume that due to insitutional constraints or the managers’ wealth constraints, such an arrangement
is not possible.
7Under the optimal contract, the manager will always maximize profits, given the ex-post productivity
level of the firm, because it is costless for the manager to do so, and because the manager’s pay will always
be increasing in profits. We therefore can restrict attention to contracts whose payments are specified
for only two values of profits, one associated with high productivity ∆z, and the other associated with
low productivity z.
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ρ∗(sH , sL) = argmax
ρ∈[0,1]
ρsHpiH + (1− ρ)sLpiL − e(z, ρ) + λzσ−1
s.t.
e(z, ρ) = Azσ−1exp(bρ)
Given the contract (sH ,sL), the manager’s optimal choice of ρ is
ρ∗(sH , sL) =
(1
b
)
log
[( 1
Ab
)
z1−σ(sHpiH − sLpiL)
]
(2.12)
Note that the manager’s effort is increasing in the difference between sHpiH and sLpiL.
As the manager’s “performance bonus” for raising productivity increases, effort increases.8
Given the initial draw of z, the optimal contracting problem faced by the firm owners
is as follows:
max
sh,sL
ρ∗(sH , sL)[(1− sH)piH ] + (1− ρ∗(sH , sL))[(1− sL)piL]
s.t.
sH ∈ [0, 1]
sL ∈ [0, 1]
ρ∗(sH , sL)sHpiH + (1− ρ∗(sH , sL))sLpiL − e(ρ∗, z) + λzσ−1 ≥ wh
ρ∗(sH , sL) is the solution to the manager’s problem
Because of the limited-liability constraint on both managers and owners, neither sH
nor sL can exceed 1 or be less than zero. The third constraint is the manager’s par-
ticipation constraint. Throughout the remainder of the section, I will assume that the
participation constraint does not bind. The case in which it does bind is not central to
either the paper’s theoretical or quantitative results, so exposition of it is relegated to
the appendix.
I am now in a position to describe the optimal contract for a thriving firm, which is
summarized in the following proposition.
8To prevent the exposition from becoming too tedious, I omit discussion of corner solutions and
assume that ρ∗ lies strictly between 0 and 1.
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Proposition 1. Assume that the manager’s participation constraint does not bind.
Under the optimal contract for a thriving firm, the following hold:
(1) sL = 0
(2) sH = max{s∗, 0} where s∗ is the solution to
[ piH
s∗piH − θpiL
]
(1− s∗) = log
[( 1
Ab
)
z1−σ(s∗piH)
]
(2.13)
(3) The probability of the manager’s efforts to raise productivity being successful is
ρ∗(sH , sL) =
(1
b
)
log
[( 1
Ab
)
z1−σ(sHpiH)
]
(2.14)
All proofs in this paper are in the appendix. The logic underlying the proposition
is fairly straightforward. Owners pay the manager quasi-rents in order to induce the
manager to exert effort to raise the firm’s productivity so that the owners may enjoy
their share of the resulting high profits. Any payment the manager receives in the
low-productivity state reduces the manager’s incentive to exert effort, so the owners set
sL = 0. The owners then choose the manager’s payment s
∗piH in the high-productivity
state so that the expected marginal increase in owners’ income from an additional unit
of managerial effort is equal to the marginal cost of inducing the manager to exert one
more unit of effort.
Under the functional form assumptions I have made for e(z, ρ), it turns out that all
producers of non-traded products will have the same probability of raising productivity.
That’s because pi(z) ∝ zσ−1 for firms that act as monopolists (see equations 8 and
10), so z drops out of the expression for ρ∗. The model therefore returns a result
akin to Gibrat’s Law, at least for producers of non-traded products. Because a firm’s
size is proportional to zσ−1, all producers of non-traded products will have the same
probability of raising their productivity regardless of their initial productivity draws.
Optimal contract for struggling firms
When a firm with initial productivity z is struggling, managers and owners take into
account the fact that the manager will lose the benefit λzσ−1 if the manager cannot raise
productivity. With profits in the low-productivity state equal to zero, the manager’s
problem becomes
21
ρ∗(sH) = argmax
ρ∈[0,1]
ρsHpiH + ρλz
σ−1 − e(z, ρ)
s.t.
e(z, ρ) = Azσ−1exp(bρ)
When profits are zero in the low-productivity state, ρ∗ is a function only of sH . Given
sH , the manager’s optimal choice of ρ is
ρ∗(sH) =
(1
b
)
log
[( 1
Ab
)
z1−σ(sHpiH + λzσ−1)
]
(2.15)
As the above expression makes evident, the threat of losing the perks valued at λzσ−1
serves as an additional incentive for managers to exert a higher level of effort.
Since struggling firms earn no profits when productivity is low, the owners only
choose sH , and a contract s is just s = sH . Their optimal contracting problem becomes
max
sH
ρ∗(sH)[(1− sH)piH ]
s.t.
sH ∈ [0, 1]
ρ∗(sH)sHpiH − e(ρ∗, z) + λzσ−1 ≥ wh
ρ∗(sH) is the solution to the manager’s problem
Proposition 2 characterizes the optimal contract for a struggling firm.
Proposition 2. Assume that the manager’s participation constraint does not bind.
Under the optimal contract for a struggling firm, the following hold:
(1) sH = max{s∗, 0} where s∗ is the solution to
( piH
s∗piH + λzσ−1
)
(1− s∗) = log
[( 1
Ab
)
z1−σ(s∗piH + λzσ−1)
]
(2.16)
(2) The probability of the manager’s efforts to raise productivity being successful is
given by
ρ∗(sH) =
(1
b
)
log
[( 1
Ab
)
z1−σ(s∗piH + λzσ−1)
]
(2.17)
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By comparing the equations for ρ∗ for thriving firms (14) and for struggling firms
(17), it would initially seem that the manager of a struggling firm will exert more effort
than the manager of a thriving firm, all else equal. That’s because the manager of
a thriving firm still earns λzσ−1 even if productivity is low, while the manager of a
struggling firm does not. The manager of the struggling firm has a much stronger
incentive to work hard to avoid the low-productivity state. However, there is another
effect at work, and it is logically possible that the manager of a struggling firm could
exert less effort than the manager of a thriving firm, all else equal. The reason is that
the owners of a struggling firm recognize that the manager already wants to work hard
to avoid losing the benefits valued at λzσ−1, so they will offer the manager a lower sH .
In extreme cases, the owners may want to offer the manager sH = 0.
9 In the calibrated
model, the manager of a firm that goes from being “thriving” to struggling always exerts
higher effort, though.
2.3 Equilibrium
Before defining an equilibrium in the model, I first present a few market clearing condi-
tions. From this point forward, I will change the notation slightly and let ρ∗(z) denote
the effort exerted by the manager of a non-traded firm with productivity z. Similarly,
let ρ∗(z, z∗) denote the value of ρ chosen by the manager of a firm in a traded industry
with productivity z that faces a foreign competitor with productivity z∗. The value of
ρ∗ should be understood to arise from the optimal contract as described in Propositions
1 and 2. Let sˆ(z) and sˆ(z, z∗) denote the corresponding contracts.
2.3.1 Market clearing
Trade is balanced, so the home country’s income equals its expenditure on the final
good, Phch. Income consists of the sum of production worker wages and aggregate firm
profits (before payments to the manager have been subtracted). The market clearing
condition for the goods market can be written as
9For sufficiently large z, the non-pecuniary perks λzσ−1 will be high enough so that the participation
constraint does not bind even if the manager receives none of the firm’s profits.
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Phch = wh(Lh −mh) +MhN
∫ ∞
0
[
(1− ρ∗(z))pihN (z) + ρ∗(z)pihN (∆z)
]
dGhN (z)
+ME
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[
(1− ρ∗(z, z∗))pihE(z, z∗) + ρ∗(z, z∗)pihE(∆z, z∗)
]
dGfE(z
∗)dGhE(z)
+MI
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[
(1− ρ∗(z, z∗))pihI(z, z∗) + ρ∗(z, z∗)pihI(∆z, z∗)
]
dGfI(z
∗)dGhI(z)
(2.18)
where mh denotes the mass of home country firms in operation. Since each firm has one
manager, only a mass of workers equal to Lh−mH earn wages. The integrals represent
profits earned in each of the three industries (non-traded = N, export-oriented = E,
and import-competing = I), with a firm’s profits in the high- and low-productivity
states weighted by the manager’s probability of raising productivity. We also have the
following labor market clearing condition:
Lh −mh = MhN
∫ ∞
0
[
(1− ρ∗(z))`hN (z) + ρ∗(z)`hN (∆z)
]
dGhN (z)
+MhE
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[
(1− ρ∗(z, z∗))`hE(z, z∗) + ρ∗(z, z∗)`hE(∆z, z∗)
]
dGfE(z
∗)dGhE(z)
+MhI
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[
(1− ρ∗(z, z∗))`hI(z, z∗) + ρ∗(z, z∗)`hI(∆z, z∗)
]
dGfI(z
∗)dGhI(z)
(2.19)
Because the home country is much smaller than the foreign country, and because
MfN >> MfI and MfN >> MfE , we can treat the foreign country as a closed economy
for the purposes of computing aggregate foreign equilibrium quantities. The foreign
goods market clearing condition is
Pfcf = wfLf +MfN
∫ ∞
0
pifN (z
∗)dGfN (z∗) (2.20)
The foreign labor market clearing condition is
Lf = MfN
∫ ∞
0
`fN (z
∗)dGfN (z∗) (2.21)
24
2.3.2 Definition of equilibrium
Take foreign production labor to be the numeraire commodity, so that wf = 1. I am
now in a position to give a definition of an equilibrium in the model.
Definition 2. An equilibrium consists of (i) prices, quantities, and labor demands for
traded products pijk(z, z
∗), qijk(z, z∗) and `ijk(z, z∗); (ii) prices, quantities, and labor
demands for non-traded products piN (z), qiN (z) and `iN (z); (iii) a wage wh; (iv) profit-
sharing contracts for home non-traded firms sˆ(z); (v) profit-sharing contracts for home
traded firms sˆ(z, z∗); and (vi) probabilities ρ∗(z) and ρ∗(z, z∗) such that:
(a) Given wh, Phch, Pfcf , and ex-post firm productivity levels, prices and quantities
chosen by producers
of traded products constitute a Bertrand equilibrium as defined in Definition 1;
(b) Given wh, Phch, Pfcf , and ex-post firm productivity levels, prices and quantities
chosen by producers
of non-traded products solve their profit maximization problem;
(d) Individual firms’ labor demands are given by (2) and (3);
(c) Labor market clearing holds in each location (equations 19 and 21);
(d) Product market clearing holds in each location (equations 18 and 20);
(e) Given wh and Phch, sˆ(z) is the optimal contract for the producer of a non-traded
product with initial
productivity draw z, and ρ∗(z) is the associated probability that the manager’s
efforts will raise
productivity;
(f) Given wh, Phch, Pfcf , and the foreign competitor’s productivity z
∗, sˆ(z, z∗) is
the optimal contract
for the producer of a traded product with initial productivity draw z, and ρ∗(z, z∗)
is the associated
probability that the manager’s efforts will raise productivity.
2.3.3 Effect of unilateral trade liberalization on firm productivities
A unilateral liberalization can be modeled as a fall in Dfh, the iceberg transportation
cost faced by foreign producers who sell to the home country. In partial equilibrium,
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a fall in tariffs will tend to lead to productivity gains. To see the effect that a fall in
Dfh has on ρ in partial equilibrium, consider a home firm with productivity z = 1 that
faces a foreign competitor with productivity z∗ = 1.44. Also let ∆ = 1.2. For simplicity,
assume wh = wf = 1 and that Dhf is high enough so that we can ignore the possibility
that the home firm sells to the foreign market. The home firm will be unable to produce
profitably in its home market, even if it raises its productivity, if ∆z < z∗/Dfh. As
illustrated in Figure 1, this means the home firm will be “out” for Dfh < 1.2. For
values of Dfh above 1.44, the home firm will produce in its own market even if it does
not raise productivity (since z > z∗/Dfh). For values of Dfh between 1.2 and 1.44, the
home firm is struggling.
As the solid line in Figure 1 shows, a fall in Dfh leads a firm to raise its productivity
substantially if it pushes the firm from the thriving category into the struggling category.
Figure 1: Manager’s choice of ρ
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The threat of losing the benefits λzσ−1 induces the manager to exert more effort.
Note also that when a firm is thriving, ρ is initially decreasing for values of Dfh close
to 1.44 before becoming constant. The reason is that as long as Dfh is sufficiently
high, the home firm acts as a monopolist (equation 7), and small changes in the foreign
competitor’s marginal costs do not affect the manager’s choice of ρ. For values of Dfh
closer to but still above 1.44, the home firm acts as a limit-pricer and sets its price equal
to the foreign competitor’s marginal cost z∗/Dfh. As Dfh increases, the home firm’s
price increases, and the quantity it produces falls. When the quantity falls, so does the
value of a reduction in unit costs, so owners induce managers to exert less effort to raise
productivity.
When general equilibrium effects are incorporated into the analysis, it is possible
that a manager will choose a lower value of ρ following a fall in Dfh. To see this, consider
a fall in Dfh from 2.4 to 2.2 so that the home firm acts as a monopolist both before and
after the fall in trade costs. Figure 1 suggests that the manager chooses the same value
of ρ in each case. However, a fall in trade costs will reduce the residual demand for the
firm’s product, as some foreign producers of traded products are now able to enter the
home market, thereby lowering aggregate prices. When faced with lower demand, the
firm produces a lower quantity. With the firm producing a lower quantity, the value of
a reduction in unit costs falls. The firm owners then pay the manager less and induce
a lower level of effort.
Since the effects of a unilateral fall in trade costs on the productivities of individual
firms are ambiguous, the effect on average industry-level productivity will be ambiguous
too. Whether or not foreign competitive pressure raises or lowers average firm-level
productivity growth within an industry depends critically on the distribution of firm
productivities at home and abroad, as well as the magnitude of the parameter λ.
2.3.4 Entrepreneurial firms
I now introduce a second type of firm into the model. Let there be some firms, which I
will call entrepreneurial firms, that are manager-owned. To this point I have been focus-
ing on firms with separate ownership and management, which I will now call managerial
firms. In each industry, there are some managerial firms and some entrepreneurial
firms. I assume that a firm’s ownership structure is given exogenously. Managers of
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entrepreneurial firms differ only from their counterparts in managerial firms in that they
receive all firm profits. Hence their choices of ρ∗ are summarized by equations (12) and
(15), with sH = sL = 1.
Qualitatively, the relationship between Dfh and ρ
∗ for an entrepreneurial firm is the
same as in Figure 1. However, the productivity “jump” that an entrepreneurial firm
takes when it moves from the thriving category to the struggling category is smaller than
the jump taken by managerial firms. The reason is that managers of entrepreneurial
firms internalize all the fruits of their efforts and therefore are already exerting effort
at a high level before a fall in Dfh pushes them into the struggling category. Since
the disutility is convex in effort (see equation 4), raising ρ incrementally is much more
costly for managers of entrepreneurial firms than for managers of managerial firms.
2.4 Evidence from Chile
Between 1974 and 1979, Chile implemented a sweeping program of trade reforms, which
included drastically lowering tariffs in the manufacturing sector from an average effective
rate of 151 percent to a uniform rate of 10 percent.10 The result was a large increase in
trade volumes in a country that had been fairly closed off to outside goods markets. In
1976, the ratio of trade to output in the manufacturing sector stood at 4.5 percent. By
1986, the figure had risen to 48.5 percent. During the same period, the ratio of imports
to output in the manufacturing sector increased from 2.1 percent to 21.7 percent.
In this section, I present two empirical findings about how Chilean plants responded
to the increase in foreign competition that resulted from the lower tariffs. Following
Liu, Roberts, and Tybout (1996) and Pavcnik (2002), I take 1979-86 to be the period of
adjustment to the trade reforms. The year 1978 was the first in which the ratio of trade
to output in the manufacturing sector exceeded 10 percent, and the figure remained
between 30 and 50 percent in each year during 1978-86. Since plant-level data prior to
1979 are not available, 1979 and not 1978 (or any earlier year) is taken as the initial
year of the adjustment period.
Using the same difference in differences regression model as Pavcnik (2002), I first
10For more background on Chile’s trade reforms, see Edwards and Lederman (1998).
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show that continuing plants11 in import-competing industries saw substantial productiv-
ity improvements relative to plants in non-traded industries during the period 1979-86.
I then extend the empirical analysis in the simplest possible way to show how pro-
ductivity growth depends on a firm’s ownership type. The plant data allow me to
classify businesses based on ownership type. One category, managerial plants, consists
of plants with separate ownership and management and therefore most aﬄicted by
principal-agent frictions. These are primarily plants in corporations. The second cat-
egory, entrepreneurial plants, consists of those with no separation between ownership
and management. The two categories of ownership structure are chosen so that there
is a clear mapping between managerial and entrepreneurial firms in the model and in
the data. Within the set of managerial plants, I find evidence that plants in import-
competing industries have higher average productivity growth than those in non-traded
industries. However, within the set of entrepreneurial plants, there is no statistically sig-
nificant difference in productivity growth among plants in import-competing industries
and plants in non-traded industries. In Section 5, I use the estimates of productivity
growth differences across plant trade orientations and ownership types to assess how
well the calibrated model performs.
2.4.1 Description of the data
Plant-level data come from the census of Chilean manufacturing plants conducted by
Chile’s National Institute of Statistics. Because of its richness, the census data has
been used by numerous researchers (e.g., Liu 1993, Liu, Roberts, and Tybout 1996, and
Pavcnik 2002). The census covers all plants with ten or more employees, resulting in a
total of 33,394 plant-year observations over the period 1979-86, or an average of 4,770
plant observations per year. In what follows, I restrict attention to the performance of
continuing plants that appear in both the first and last years of the sample. Doing so
leaves a total of 6,012 plant-year observations in the baseline analysis.
The dataset contains detailed data on firm inputs and outputs, as well as input and
output price deflators. Output price deflators are obtained at the 3-digit ISIC level from
the Chilean Central Bank’s price indices. Firm-specific deflators for intermediate inputs
are derived using input-output tables provided by the Chilean Central Bank. (See Liu
11defined as plants that appear in both the first and last years of the sample.
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1993 for more details.) I construct my key performance measure, labor productivity,
for each firm by dividing real output by the average number of workers employed in a
given year.12
Data on industry-level trade flows come from the World Bank’s Trade, Production,
and Protection database. The database reports the annual value of industry imports,
exports, and output at the 3-digit ISIC level for Chile’s manufacturing sector. Using
these data, I calculate the ratio of net imports to output, NM/Y, and the ratio of
gross trade to output, (X+M)/Y, for each industry, averaged over the period 1979-
86. Using a two-stage process, I then classify each industry as belonging to one of three
categories: import-competing, export-oriented, or non-traded. First, if the average value
of (X+M)/Y is less than 0.15 during 1979-86, I classify the industry as “non-traded.” Of
the remaining industries, I classify those with NM/Y > 0.2 as “import-competing” and
those with NM/Y < 0.2 as “export-oriented.” The cutoff values for NM/Y are chosen
so that no industries in the data fall into a potential fourth category in which gross
trade volumes are high but net trade is close to zero. All of the traded industries in
the data have either NM/Y < 0.2 or NM/Y > 0.2. There are 11 import-competing
industries, 3 export-oriented industries, and 14 non-traded industries. I then assign a
trade orientation to each plant according to its 3-digit industry’s trade classification. For
example, all plants in ISIC industry 381 (fabricated metal products) will be classified as
“import-competing plants” because “fabricated metal products” is an import-competing
industry. Appendix Table A1 lists the industries by trade orientation.
One issue with the data is the fact that the 3-digit ISIC classification changes for a
significant number of plants during the sample period. In some cases (accounting for
3.5 percent of all continuing plants), the plant switches to an industry with a different
trade classification. Since the switch to an industry of a different trade orientation may
be an endogenous response to the trade reforms, I drop these plants from the set of
continuing plants.
I also study differences in plant performance by ownership type. Each plant in the
dataset is classified as one of seven business types: sole proprietorship, partnership,
cooperative, corporation, collective, public, or other. Among continuing plants, 20
percent are classified as sole proprietorships, 49 percent as partnerships, and 23 percent
12Data on employment hours are not available.
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Table 1: Classification of business types
Business type Managerial plant?
Corporation Yes
Collective Yes
Cooperative Yes
Public Yes
Sole proprietorship No
Partnership No
as corporations. The remaining 8 percent are either government-operated businesses,
cooperatives, collectives, or “other.” The main idea of this paper is that trade compe-
tition can lead to firm growth by mitigating principal-agent problems within firms. By
exploiting the information on plant ownership types, I am able to provide evidence that
the key mechanism in my model is at work during Chile’s period of adjustment to trade
reforms. Using the information on business types, I create a binary variable called the
Managerial dummy, which takes on a value of 1 for plants with separate ownership and
management. These are the plants with a moral hazard problem and are represented by
the managerial plants in the model. Plants that I do not classify as managerial plants
are those without separate ownership and management, and they are represented by
the entrepreneurial plants in the model. Table 1 shows how I classify plants by owner-
ship structure in the regressions that follow. I omit the category “other” because of its
ambiguity.
2.4.2 Productivity growth by trade orientation and ownership type
In this section, I compare labor productivity growth across trade orientations and own-
ership types during the period 1979-86. To keep terminology consistent with the theo-
retical section of the paper, industries
are defined by trade orientation, so there are three industries: the import-competing
industry, the export-oriented industry, and the non-traded industry. (References to
specific ISIC industries, where needed, will be made explicit.) I borrow the following
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difference in differences framework from Pavcnik (2002) to test for differences in average
productivity growth among plants of different trade orientations:
∆log(lpi) = β0 + βTTradei + βXXi + i (2.22)
Here, ∆log(lpi) is the log change in labor productivity of plant i from 1979-86. Trade
is a vector of indicator variables corresponding to the different trade orientations, and
X is a vector of control variables, which in the baseline regression only includes controls
for a plant’s 2-digit ISIC industry affiliation. (The indicator variable for the non-traded
Table 2: Productivity growth by trade orientation and ownership type
Dependent Variable:
Log change productivity, 1979-86
1 2
Import-competing 0.089b 0.035
(0.045) (0.049)
Export-oriented 0.163a 0.096
(0.058) (0.065)
Managerial 0.034
(0.033)
Import*Managerial 0.131b
(0.056)
Export*Managerial 0.244b
(0.101)
2-digit ISIC industry dummies Yes Yes
Obs 3006 3006
Significance at 1, 5, or 10 % level is denoted by a, b, or c.
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industry is the omitted dummy.)
The results are reported in column 1 of Table 2. Import-competing plants have
productivity growth 8.9 percentage points higher on average than non-traded plants,
and export-oriented plants have productivity growth 16.3 percent higher than their non-
traded counterparts. The results for the import-competing industry are roughly in line
with Pavcnik (2002), who finds that plants in import-competing industries have average
productivity growth 6.9 percentage points higher than plants in non-traded industries.
Pavcnik also finds that average productivity growth is 4.9 percentage points higher in the
export-oriented industry than the non-traded industry, substantially smaller than the
16.3 percentage point difference I find. The difference in our results can be attributed
to differences in our empirical approaches. For example, she uses TFP estimates as her
measure of productivity, whereas I use labor productivity.
To ascertain the relationship between ownership type and productivity growth, I
modify the specification in (22) by incorporating the Managerial dummy and interaction
terms between Managerial and the trade orientation indicators:
∆log(lpi) = β0 +β1Manageriali+β2Trade+β3Managerial∗Trade+βXXi+i (2.23)
Column 2 of Table 2 presents the results. As it shows, the presence of agency
frictions is associated with higher productivity growth, but only for import-competing
and export-oriented plants. For non-traded plants, there are no statistically significant
differences between plants based on Managerial classification. Among plants within the
import-competing industry, managerial plants had productivity growth 16.5 percentage
points higher than entrepreneurial plants, and among plants in the export-oriented
industry, the figure is 27.8.
2.4.3 Robustness
In this section, I address two potential concerns related to the findings in the previous
section. First, since I use labor productivity as the key performance measure, it may
be that some types of firms experience higher productivity growth than others because
they accumulate capital faster during the adjustment period to trade reforms. Using
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Table 3: Robustness tests
Dependent Variable:
Log change productivity, 1979-86
1 2 3 4
Import-competing 0.093b 0.035 0.060 0.061
(0.045) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Export-oriented 0.165a 0.099 0.088 0.090
(0.063) (0.065) (0.070) (0.070)
Managerial 0.040 0.039 0.046
(0.033) (0.034) (0.035)
Import*Managerial 0.130b 0.079 0.077
(0.058) (0.060) (0.060)
Export*Managerial 0.260b 0.269b 0.282b
(0.102) (0.108) (0.109)
materials79 −0.059 -0.067
(0.038) (0.046)
k growth 0.057a 0.057a 0.057a
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
2-digit ISIC industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2350 3006 2350 2350
Significance at 1, 5, or 10 % level is denoted by a, b, or c.
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the subset of firms in my sample for which data on real capital stocks are available, I
repeat the regressions from Section 4 with a control for capital growth. I also redo the
regression (23) with a control for initial firm size. To the extent that plants classified as
managerial plants are larger than those classified as entrepreneurial plants, any produc-
tivity growth differences due to size differences may be influencing the results in column
2 of Table 2.
Table 3 presents the results. The variable k growth is the log change in a plant’s real
capital stock between 1979 and 1986. As column 1 shows, differences in capital accu-
mulation are not driving the high labor productivity growth of import-competing and
export-oriented plants relative to non-traded plants. While the coefficient on k growth is
positive (as expected) and significant, the coefficient on the Import-competing indicator
is actually higher than in column 1 of Table 2 (0.093 versus 0.089). Note though that
the sample is different in the two regressions.
Column 2 of Table 3 shows how the relationship between a firm’s ownership classi-
fication and productivity growth changes when I control for initial plant size. I use the
real value of a firm’s raw materials inputs in 1979 (materials79) as a proxy for size, and
as comparison with column 2 of Table 2 shows, including the size control hardly affects
the results. For example, without the size control, the coefficient on Import*Managerial
is 0.131, and with the size control it is 0.130. In each case, the coefficient is significant
at the 5% level.13
Column 3 shows how controlling for capital growth affects the interaction between a
firm’s ownership classification and its trade classification. After controlling for capital
growth, the coefficient on the interaction term Import*Managerial is still positive, but
it is smaller than before and no longer significant. This result does not necessarily
weaken the central idea of the paper though, which is that foreign competition has a
stronger effect on managers’ incentives when ownership is separate from management.
As mentioned earlier, there is evidence that managers incur private costs associated
with making capital investments, and competition could provide them with stronger
13In other specifications (not reported), I have used output and employment in 1979 as measures
of a plant’s initial size, with minimal effect on the results. But since output and employment are by
definition correlated with a plant’s labor productivity, productivity growth will reflect measurement
errors of a plant’s initial output and employment. Hence I use raw materials inputs as a proxy for initial
size.
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incentives to make investments that raise productivity. Column 4 adds the size control
to the regression in column 3, and again it does not change the results materially.
2.5 Calibration
I perform a comparative static exercise in which I solve the model with high iceberg
transportation costs for foreign producers and compare it to the results when trans-
portation costs are low for foreign producers. I set Dfh = 2.6 initially to capture the
fact that average effective tariffs were 150 percent before Chile’s reforms. I also assume
an additional 10 percent transportation cost that the government cannot affect, so I
have Dfh = 2.6 instead of Dfh = 2.5. I then solve the model with Dfh = 1.2 (repre-
senting the uniform 10 percent tariff in manufacturing plus a 10 percent transportation
cost). The cost of shipping from the home country to the foreign country is set equal to
Dhf = 1.1 both before and after the unilateral fall in trade costs. The set of continuing
firms in the model will be the firms that produce both when Dfh is high and when Dfh
is low. These firms are the focus of my quantitative analysis.
The quantitative strategy, in brief, is to calibrate the model parameters to several
targets, including trade flows, and then evaluate how well the model performs in repro-
ducing the two empirical results. When calibrated using data from Chile’s trade reform
adjustment period 1979-86, the model generates firm productivity growth patterns that
are consistent with the two empirical results that were the focus of the previous sec-
tion. First, import-competing firms in the model have higher growth on average than
non-traded firms. Second, in the import-competing industry, managerial firms have
higher productivity growth than entrepreneurial firms, but in the non-traded industry
the average performance of the two ownership types is roughly the same.
The masses of firms in each industry and of each ownership type are chosen to
match their abundance in the data. I assume that each firm in the home country in
industry k draws its productivity from an industry-specific lognormal distribution with
location parameter µhk and shape parameter σ
2
hk. Foreign firms draw from lognormal
distributions governed by parameters µfk and σ
2
fk. I normalize µhN (corresponding
to the non-traded industry) to 1, and the other µ’s for the home country are chosen
36
to match the initial mean productivity for each industry in 1979, relative to the non-
traded industry. (These and the values of other parameters are presented in Table 4.)
I assume values for σ2hN and each σ
2
fk. In particular, I set σ
2
hN = 0.1 and σ
2
fk = 0.1
for each foreign industry k. This parameterization gives productivity dispersions in the
home non-traded industry and the foreign industries that are consistent with Syverson
(2004).14 Since I assume σ2fk is the same for each foreign industry, I denote it henceforth
by σ2f , dropping the industry subscript.
I take ∆, the fraction by which managers can raise productivity, directly from the
data on firm productivity growth. Among the set of continuing firms (in any indus-
try) that had positive productivity growth between 1979 and 1986, the mean rate of
productivity growth was 38 percent.15 I therefore set ∆ = 1.38.
There are 9 parameters that remain to be calibrated: σ, A, b, λ, θ, µfN , µfI , µfE ,
σ2hI and σ
2
hE . Recall that σ is the elasticity of substitution between goods, A is the
scaling parameter on the effort function (4), and b is the curvature parameter on the
effort function. I arbitrarily set µfN = µhN ( = 1), and choosing other reasonable
values for µfN affects the results only negligibly. I will assume σ
2
hI = σ
2
hE . For the
seven remaining parameters, I have seven targets.
Targets for calibration:
1) Ratio of exports to output within the export-oriented industry, 1977
2) Trade/Output ratio within Chile’s manufacturing sector in 1977
3) Trade/Output ratio within Chile’s manufacturing sector in 1986
4) Ratio of output in import-competing industry to output in non-traded industry,
1977
5) Fraction of import-competing entrepreneurial plants that exit between 1979 and
1986
14In principle, one could simply choose the home-country variance parameters to match the pro-
ductivity dispersions seen in each industry in the Chilean data. However, the Chilean data on plant
productivities are noisy and imply large values for σ2hk. Using these values generates implausible results
for a wide range of choices for other parameters: When productivities are highly dispersed, only a small
number of highly productive firms in traded industries produce at all.
15I drop plants with productivity growth greater than 100 percent to eliminate outlier effects. When
all plants with positive productivity growth are included, the mean rate of productivity growth is 53
percent. Measurement error can likely account for the fairly large number of plants that experienced
productivity growth above 100 percent.
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6) Difference in exit rates between import-competing entrepreneurial plants and
import-competing
managerial plants
7) Average markup (computed in the data as net profits divided by gross value of
output)
When I calibrate the model, I solve it twice: once with Dfh = 2.6, and once with
Dfh = 1.2, which correspond to 1979 and 1986, respectively. The year 1979 marks the
final year of trade reforms that were put into place beginning in 1974, but it is the
first year for which firm productivity data are available. The year 1978 was the first
one in which trade/output exceeded 10 percent in the manufacturing sector, so I will
assume that firms’ productivity responses to the reforms largely took place after 1978.
However, precisely because trade volumes jump substantially between 1977 and 1979,
it is appropriate to use trade data from 1977 for targets 1-4.
Targets 1-4 help pin down the relative productivities of particular industries in
particular locations, and the average markup is most closely related to σ. Target 5 is
closely related to the disperson of productivities within the import-competing industry,
as captured by the parameter σ2hI . To see this, suppose the distribution of productivities
is degenerate in each industry and that µhE > µhI . Then for certain parameter values,
moving from high tariffs to low tariffs could lead to complete specialization as all import-
competing firms exit.
The parameter λ is critical to the results, so the strategy to calibrate it also requires
some explanation. Target 6 is highly sensitive to the choice of λ and provides the most
information about its value of the targets listed above. In the data, 50.1 percent of
import-competing entrepreneurial plants exited between 1979 and 1986. Meanwhile,
only 41.4 percent of import-competing managerial plants exited, a difference of 8.75
percent between the two categories. As discussed in Section 3, λ has a stronger effect
on managerial effort in managerial firms than in entrepreneurial firms. As a result, a
higher λ means that fewer import-competing managerial firms exit, relative to import-
competing entrepreneurial firms.
Table 4 presents the calibrated parameters. The elasticity of substitution takes on
value 3.4, which is somewhat low but is within the range of estimates reported in Broda
and Weinstein (2006), who estimate the elasticities of substitution within U.S. industr-
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Table 4: Parameter values
Parameter Description Value
σ Elasticity of substitution 3.40
A Scaling parameter on effort function 0.02
b Curvature parameter on effort function 3.70
λ Manager’s non-pecuniary benefit 1.50
(µhN , µhI , µhE) Domestic prod. mean parameters (1,0.45,0.85)
(µfN , µfI , µfE) Foreign prod. mean parameters (1,0.81,0.75)
σ2hI(= σ
2
hE) Productivity variance parameter 0.113
ies. To give a sense of scale for λ, the value λ = 1.5 implies that total non-pecuniary
benefits across all managers have value equal to 33 percent of aggregate profits, which at
first glance perhaps seems high. However, Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that the pri-
vate benefits of corporate control can be quite large, especially in developing countries.16
Moreover, the assumption that managers are risk-neutral inflates the calibrated value
of λ: A risk-neutral manager of a struggling firm requires a higher value of λ to exert a
given level of effort than does a risk-averse manager of a struggling firm, all else equal.
Table 5 presents the central results of the paper, showing average productivity
growth by trade orientation and ownership type, with average productivity growth in
the non-traded industry normalized to zero. The data for Table 5 come from columns
1 and 2 in Table 2. In particular, the bold numbers come from column 1, and the
differences decomposed by ownership type are derived from column 2. Although not
all of the coefficients in Table 2 are statistically significant, they provide a baseline for
assessing the model’s performance. The model successfully generates the higher pro-
ductivity growth seen among import-competing firms than among non-traded firms.
The average growth among import-competing firms is 6.1 percent higher than among
non-traded firms in the model, and 8.9 percent higher in the data. Table 5 also shows
differences in behavior between managerial firms and entrepreneurial firms following the
16Dyck and Zingales estimate the private benefits associated with having a controlling stake in a
corporation in many countries. They find that the private benefits of control are equal in value to 14
percent of a company’s value on average, with a maximum value of 65 percent in their data. Estimates
of a manager’s private benefits are harder to come by, but the measured private benefits of corporate
control are widely thought to include many of the sorts of perquisites that top executives also enjoy.
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tariff reduction. Among import-competing firms in the model, managerial firms have
average productivity growth that is 5.6 percent ( = 9.6 - 4.0) higher than entrepreneurial
firms. This is qualitatively consistent with the data, which show a difference of 16.5
percentage points, but smaller. Among non-traded firms, there is little difference (0.6
percent) in average productivity growth between the two ownership types. In the data,
the difference is 3.4 percent, which is both small and statistically insignificant.
Table 5: Average percent productivity growth by industry and business type
(continuing plants, relative to non-traded industry)
Industry/Ownership Type Model Data
Import-competing 6.1 8.9
Managerial 9.6 18.9
Entrepreneurial 4.0 2.4
Non-traded 0.0 0.0
Managerial 0.4 2.3
Entrepreneurial -0.2 -1.1
Overall, the model performs well in explaining the high productivity growth of
import-competing firms relative to non-traded firms, accounting for 69 percent of the
difference in average productivity growth between the two sets of firms. The model also
accounts for 34 percent of the difference in average productivity growth between import-
competing managerial plants and import-competing entrepreneurial plants. There are
many potential reasons why plants of different ownership types might respond differ-
ently to increases in foreign competition. For example, corporations may in general have
better access to credit or access to better technologies than sole proprietorships. The
model shows that the presence of agency frictions is in fact a quantitatively important
reason for the differences in productivity growth between the two ownership types.
The model performs less well in matching the data from the export-oriented indus-
try, although the model still replicates many of the qualitative patterns seen in the data
for that industry. The export-oriented industry in the model has average productiv-
ity growth 4.6 percent higher than the non-traded industry, but in the data the figure
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is 16.3 percent. Moreover, in the model, the export-oriented industry has lower aver-
age productivity growth than the import-competing industry, but the opposite is true
in the data. When the productivity gains in the export-oriented industry are decom-
posed according to the ownership structure of the firms, the story is much the same.
While managerial firms in the export-oriented industry have higher average productiv-
ity growth than export-oriented entrepreneurial firms (6.6 versus 3.8 percentage points),
the difference is not nearly as large as the 27.8 percentage point difference observed in
the data. Some possible explanations for the mismatch between the model and the data
are given in the next section.
Though the model is successful in matching some key features of relative productivity
growth rates across industries and ownership types, it does not match absolute growth
rates. In the data, non-traded plants experienced productivity growth of 16.7 percent
between 1979 and 1986. In the model, the average non-traded plant’s productivity falls
by 3.3 percent (though this has been normalized to 0 in Table 4). I do not view this as
a significant challenge to the model, though, since the model is not intended to capture
trends in productivity growth. Instead, it is designed to capture one-time productivity
improvements that take place through the elimination of X-inefficiencies.
2.6 Discussion
The logic that underlies the model results in Table 5 is fairly intuitive. Firms have
higher productivity growth when they are struggling, as managers exert more effort
to keep the firm profitable and keep their non-pecuniary benefits of working as man-
agers. When tariffs are lowered, foreign competitors have an easier time capturing the
domestic market for a product and push firms that were previously “thriving” into the
“struggling” category. These firms then experience higher productivity growth. The
increased competitive pressure from abroad most affects domestic firms in the import-
competing industry because they face highly-productive foreign counterparts who can
usurp them when tariffs fall. As a result, the industry experiences substantial productiv-
ity growth.17 Export-oriented firms are subject to the same forces as import-competing
17Increased foreign competition will also force some previously “struggling” firms to exit. But these
are not continuing firms, which are the only firms considered in Table 5.
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firms, but less so. Even with low tariffs, foreign firms have difficulty displacing the
relatively produtive export-oriented firms in the domestic market. Compared to the
import-competing industry, few firms in the export-oriented industry are forced into the
“struggling” category following trade liberalization. So while lower tariffs induce some
managers in the export-oriented industry to work harder in order to maintain their
non-pecuniary benefits, the effect on average industry productivity growth is smaller
than in the import-competing industry.
Non-traded firms, facing no head-to-head foreign competitors, are not directly af-
fected by the trade liberalization. It is only through general equilibrium effects that
the liberalization can induce managers of non-traded firms to exert either more or less
effort. The net general equilibrium effects turn out to induce slightly negative average
productivity growth, as a lower price level Ph (and thus lower demand) more than offsets
lower wages: Average productivity among non-traded firms falls by 3.3 percent.
Consider now the fact that in import-competing industries, managerial firms experi-
ence higher productivity growth than entrepreneurial firms. In both types of firms, man-
agers will work harder to protect their non-pecuniary benefits when the firm’s survival
is threatened by a foreign competitor. But prior to the fall in tariffs, the managers of
import-competing entrepreneurial firms were already working hard to raise productivity.
These owner-managers, because they fully internalize the benefits of their own efforts,
initially exert substantially more effort than the managers of firms with principal-agent
frictions. And because the effort function (4) is convex in ρ, it is harder for managers of
entrepreneurial firms to increase ρ further than it is for managers of managerial firms to
do so. To put it loosely, managerial firms have more room for improvement. Competi-
tion from abroad therefore has a stronger effect on productivity for firms with separate
ownership and management.
2.6.1 Real income gains
Real income in the home country of the model is equal to ch. (Since trade is balanced,
real income and real output, ch, are equal.) In the calibrated model, lowering the
marginal trade cost Dfh from 2.6 to 1.2 results in real income gains of 1.58 percent.
The usual gains arising from comparative advantage contribute to the increase in real
income, and further gains come from the endogenous productivity growth of domestic
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firms. One important source of productivity growth is the reduction of managerial slack
in firms that have separate ownership and management. The manager of a “thriving”
firm exerts effort below the first-best level if ownership is separate from management,
but if foreign competition causes the firm to become a “struggling” firm, then the
manager will work harder. The threat of losing the perks λzσ−1 aligns the incentives of
the manager more closely with the interests of the firm owners.
Table 6: Real income growth
Version % change in real income
Baseline model 1.58
Frictionless model 1.25
Difference 0.33
To quantify the portion of the real income gains attributable to the reduction in
principal-agent frictions, I simulate Chile’s unilateral liberalization in an alternate, fric-
tionless version of the model. In the frictionless model, all firms are owned by managers.
That is, all firms are entrepreneurial firms. The number of firms in each industry is cho-
sen to match the number of all firms in each industry in the data, without regard to
ownership type. I use all of the other parameters calibrated in the previous section
when solving the frictionless model. As Table 6 shows, when trade costs faced by for-
eign producers fall from Dfh = 2.6 to Dfh = 1.2 in the frictionless model, real income
increases by 1.25 percent. Real income gains are 0.33 percentage points lower than in
the baseline model, indicating that one cost of trade barriers is to prevent competition
from mitigating principal-agent frictions, and that this cost is non-trivial.18
2.6.2 Some comments on the export-oriented industry
In the baseline model, productivity growth in the export-oriented industry is not as high
as in the data. Also, in the data, export-oriented managerial plants have much higher
productivity growth than export-oriented entrepreneurial plants. In the model, the
18I am not aware of any other studies that attempt to quantify the losses that result from principal-
agent frictions. But as a point of quantitative comparison, Harberger (1954) finds in his classic study
that the static deadweight losses from monopoly are equal to around 0.1 percent of output in the U.S.
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difference is much smaller. One potential reason for the mismatch between the model
and the data is that I have not allowed managers to differ in their skills. A richer model
might allow effort requirements to differ across managers. High-skill managers could
have a high probability, ρ, of raising productivity while putting in little effort. If the
model also included a competitive market for managerial talent, I conjecture that high-
skill managers would disproportionately be employed by export-oriented firms, which
could potentially amplify the effects of foreign competition on productivity growth in
the export-oriented industry.
It is also possible that many of the export-oriented plants in the data are foreign-
owned and vertically integrated with their parent companies. Foreign-owned plants may
have access to better technology or have stronger incentives to innovate than import-
competing firms, which my model does not capture. To the extent that foreign-owned
plants are more likely to be classified as corporations, export-oriented managerial plants
could be expected to have higher average productivity growth than export-oriented
entrepreneurial plants. The data do not contain information on the nationality of a
plant’s owner, though.
2.7 Conclusion
Firms often raise productivity in response to competitive pressure from abroad follow-
ing a unilateral fall in trade barriers. This paper focuses on the role of principal-agent
frictions between firm owners and managers to explain why a firm might raise produc-
tivity in the face of shrinking sales. If competition puts the manager in danger of losing
job perks, the manager will work harder to raise productivity. The model considered
here can account quantitatively for the relatively high growth seen among plants in
import-competing industries following Chile’s unilateral tariff reduction in the 1970s, as
compared to plants in non-traded goods industries. Moreover, the model accounts for a
large portion of the difference in productivity growth between import-competing plants
with different ownership structures. The alleviation of principal-agent frictions emerges
as a substantial gain from trade that has not previously been quantified.
Chapter 3
Linking Firm Structure and Skill
Premium
3.1 Introduction
In this essay we bring new data and new theory to bear on a longstanding question:
Why do large firms pay higher wages than smaller firms? While many explanations
focus on the fact that large firms employ disproportionately more labor-augmenting
technology than smaller firms (e.g. Dunne and Schmitz (1995), Dunne et al. (2002)),
we propose a different story: Larger firms choose organizational structures with more
layers of management, and the wages paid to managers increase as the number of layers
grows. We develop a model in which managers near the top of the management hierarchy
in large firms have a larger marginal contribution to output than their counterparts at
smaller firms since they oversee a larger quantity of firm activities. As a result, they
receive higher wages.
Our model is consistent with empirical evidence that the wage premium offered by
large firms is greater among skilled employees than among unskilled employees (e.g.
Brown and Medoff (1989), Davis et al. (1991), and Idson and Oi (1999)). Equivalently,
the skill premium (the average wage a firm pays to skilled employees divided by the
average wage it pays to unskilled employees) is increasing in firm size.
We are able to go a step further, using recent data from Chile’s manufacturing sector
to show that managers in particular receive a large wage premium at large firms - much
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more so than other categories of skilled workers. The empirical literature typically uses
broad definitions of skilled and unskilled labor to study the skill premium. For example,
some studies (e.g. and Pavcnik (2003)) treat blue-collar workers as skilled and white-
collar workers as unskilled even though there are substantial skill differences within
each group. (For example, both a CEO and a data entry employee would be classified
as white-collar.) By using detailed plant-level data on employment and wages from
Chile’s Manufacturing Industry National Survey (ENIA) during the period 1995-2007,
we are able to obtain a more granular picture of the wage premia offered by large firms
within different labor categories. We construct and study several alternative measures
of the skill premium at the firm level. One measure is the ratio of the average wage
a firm’s managers receive to the ratio of wages a firm’s unskilled production workers
receive. Another is the ratio of average wages received by skilled production workers
(“technicians”) to average wages received by unskilled production workers. The latter
ought to most directly capture any skill-bias in the technology hired by large firms.
What we find is striking. The effect of firm size on the manager skill premium is
close to 20 times greater than the effect of size on the production worker skill premium.
Our results suggest that managerial inputs and firm hierarchies are an important reason
why large firms pay a higher skill premium than small firms.
To investigate the relationship between firm size and the skill premium theoretically,
we develop a hierarchical model of firms that borrows elements from Caliendo and
Rossi-Hansberg (2012) in which large firms optimally choose organizational structures
with more layers of management than small firms. A manager receives direct reports
from employees on the next-lowest layer (either production workers or lower-ranked
managers) and is able to augment their output multiplicatively using her managerial
labor. High-level managers at large firms, who have the scope to augment large amounts
of output, receive high wages. Small firms, producing relatively little output, have
no such high-productivity managers and therefore pay their managers lower wages on
average. Additionally, since wages for unskilled workers are constant across firms in our
model, the skill premium is increasing in firm size.
An immediate implication of the model is that managers with more direct reports
receive higher wages. We find evidence in the Chilean data consistent with this predic-
tion: The skill premium a firm pays to its managers is increasing in the firm’s ratio of
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managers to unskilled workers.
One novel feature of our model is that the number of layers of management a firm
chooses is a continuous, rather than discrete variable. Doing so gives the model sub-
stantial flexibility and allows us to map the firm’s production function into a class of
familiar production functions in which workers differ only in the quality units they sup-
ply. The advantage of our model, relative to those with just human capital, is that it
allows us in addition to evaluate firm hierarchical choices. While the notion of having,
say, 2.5 layers of management is not immediately intuitive, we will attempt to provide
some clarity later when we present the model.
This paper is connected to an extensive empirical literature on the relationship
between firm size and wages. Brown and Medoff (1989) provided an early contribution
by showing that large firms tend to pay their workers higher wages than smaller firms.
The same phenomenon has been documented by many other researchers. For instance,
Davis et al. (1991) study U.S. Census manufacturing data from 1963-86 and find a steep
monotonic relationship between a firm’s size (in terms of number of employees) and the
average wage paid to its workers. Idson and Oi (1999) corroborate their results using
more recent Census data.
Most empirical work, including the Davis et al. (1991) study cited above, also
shows that the wage gap between large and small firms is the largest among skilled
workers, indicating that the within-firm skill premium increases, on average, with firm
size. Haskel (1998) provides a counterpoint by showing that, among UK manufacturing
firms in the 1980s, small firms had a higher skill premium than larger firms.
Many explanations have been advanced for the wage premium paid by large firms
(for a summary, see Katz and Summers (1989)). One explanation for why large firms
pay higher wages than small firms that has garnered substantial empirical support is
that large firms demand more skilled labor than small firms. For example, Abowd et al.
(1999) provide evidence from France, and Zweimuller and Winter-Ebmer (2003) provide
evidence from Switzerland. One reason why large firms demand more skilled workers
is that they need skilled labor to operate more advanced production technology (See
Dunne and Schmitz (1995) or Dunne et al. (2002)). While differences in technology
appear to contribute meaningfully to the wage gap between large and small firms, a
substantial portion of the variation remains unexplained by technological differences.
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The technological explanation for the firm-size wage gap has been adopted by re-
searchers seeking to understand the effects of international trade on labor markets.
Bernard and Jensen (1999) document that exporting firms, which tend to be the largest
firms, raise the demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor, leading to increases
in the skill premium. Yeaple (2005) and Bustos (2011) present models explaining ex-
porters’ high demand for skilled labor. By serving a large international market, ex-
porters have a stronger incentive to invest in cost-reducing technologies than firms that
only serve a small local market. To the extent that the new, labor-saving technologies
require skilled labor to operate, large exporting firms will hire more skilled labor than
smaller firms. Helpman et al. (2010) further develop this argument theoretically.
Our theoretical approach to studying the firm-size wage gap differs from existing
theories in that we focus on the effect of firm size on organizational structure. While
our model is consistent with the fact that larger firms demand higher-skilled employees
than smaller firms, we develop explicitly the idea that larger firms choose a hierarchical
structure with more levels than smaller firms. To do so, we draw on the hierarchi-
cal model of Garicano (2000) in which firms optimally choose the number of levels of
management by trading off gains from having more managers solve problems against
the costs of communication between many levels of management. The basic structure
of the model has been adapted to study the effects of international trade on organiza-
tional structure (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)) as well as aggregate productivity
differences between countries (Grobovsek (2013)).
Relative to their models, our main theoretical contribution is to model the number
of management levels that a firm chooses as a continuous, rather than discrete, choice.
Doing so demonstrates that our model is essentially a standard, simple human capital
model with a restriction on firms which require them to hire specific ratios of workers
across levels of education. This gives the ability to make specific predictions about firm
organizational structure and skill premia. Instead of being perfectly substitutable in
production, imposing a structural hierarchy upon firms turns employees with varying
levels of education into complements. Two workers cannot simply replace a manager but
must work in conjunction with managers in order to accomplish additional tasks. Larger
firms require more levels and a higher average level of human capital, and consequently
they pay a higher average wage.
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Finally, our paper relates broadly to the extensive literature on the increase in the
skill premium over time observed in many countries. Skill-biased technical change is the
most prominent (and perhaps the most debated) hypothesis for why the skill premium
has risen. While many studies support the skill-biased technical change hypothesis, the
evidence is mixed. Card and DiNardo (2002) provide a review of the debate and find
the hypothesis lacking. Pavcnik (2003) studies plant-level employment data from Chile
- though from an earlier time period than we do - and finds that skill-biased technical
change cannot explain the increases in the skill premium observed in her sample. Doms
et al. (1997) come to a similar conclusion when studying U.S. manufacturing plant data.
In each case, controlling for unobserved plant characteristics eliminates the effect of a
plant’s technology on the premium it pays to its skilled workers. While we do not focus
on the behavior of the skill premium over time, our results resonate with theirs in that
technology does not appear to be a key driver of our empirical results concerning the
skill premium.
The essay proceeds as follows: In Section 3.2 we present our data findings. In Sec-
tion 3.3 we introduce a simple, discrete firm structure. Section 3.3 extends the firm
structure to allow for a flexible selection of both levels and measure of employees. Sec-
tion 3.4 presents and characterizes a general equilibrium model with the firm structure
introduced in the previous section. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
In this section we use data from the Manufacturing Industry National Survey (ENIA)
compiled by the Chilean National Statistics Institute (INE) to analyze the relationship
between size and skill premium. This database allows us to differentiate between ex-
penditures on different types of skilled workers. In this way we are able to explain more
precisely how size affects skill premium.
ENIA compiles economic and accounting information for registered firms that are
established in Chile and have 10 or more employees.1 We have annual information from
1995 to 2007 for around 4,200 firms per year, although information differentiating types
1INE targets firms with 10 or more employees. If a firm has more than one establishment, each
establishment is reported separately. In this case, there can be reports by establishments with under 10
employees.
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Table 1: Skill Premium by Type of Skilled Worker
Managers 5.56
Technicians 1.70
Owners 2.62
Administrative Personnel 1.41
All skilled workers 1.66
Mean number of workers 48.41
Std. deviation: 75.99
Source: INE. Authors’ calculations.
of skilled workers is only available beginning in 2000.
The available information allows us to distinguish between skilled and unskilled
workers, as well as how much was spent on employees of each type. Unskilled workers
are non specialized workers in charge of executing tasks, mainly manual, that are directly
related to the production process (“Blue Collar”). We categorize all other employees as
skilled workers (“White Collar”).2
We now analyze the relation between size and skill premium. We define the skill
premium of a firm as the ratio of the average wage per skilled worker to the average wage
per unskilled worker. We are able to identify different types of skilled workers in the data.
In particular skilled workers can be further divided into owners, managers, technicians
and administrative personnel. For each firm we estimate five measures of skill premium:
a skill premium for each of the types of skilled workers and a skill premium aggregating
across all skilled workers. Table 1 shows the resulting skill premium by type of skilled
worker. Note that the average manager gets paid over five and a half times the wage
of an unskilled worker. This number is much higher than the skill premium for other
types of skilled workers.
Next, we analyze the impact of the size of a firm on the skill premium. To do this
we run the following regression:
SPi,t = β0 + β1sizeit + αt + γind + εit, (3.1)
2Only full-time workers are included in the analysis.
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where sizeit is the natural logarithm of the total number of workers at firm i in period
t, αt is a time fixed effect, and γind is an industry fixed effect. Table 2 shows that the
skill premium is increasing in the size of a firm. This result is robust across all types
of skilled workers. Moreover, size seems to affect the skill premium of managers more
than it affects the skill premium of other skilled workers. In particular, the effect of size
on the skill premium of technicians is very small: Holding all other variables constant,
an increase of 1% in the size of a firm raises the skill premium of technicians by 0.0008.
That is, even though there is a positive relation, the size of a firm does not seem to be
economically significant in determining the skill premium of technicians.
The regression results suggest that bigger firms pay higher wages for skilled workers
due to a higher marginal productivity of managers, not of technicians. In particular,
the data casts doubt on whether larger firms acquiring skill biased capital can explain
why larger firms offer a higher skill premium. 3 Rather, our data analysis supports
the importance of considering the organizational structure of a firm when analyzing the
relation between size and skill premium.
Table 2: Skill Premium versus Size of Firm
Managers Technicians Owners Administrative All skilled
Personnel workers
Size 1.767∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 1.641∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.006) (0.033) (0.005) (0.004)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 13, 549 20, 381 13, 623 22, 842 34, 291
Adjusted R2 0.264 0.082 0.204 0.089 0.192
OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***: Significant at 1%.
Source: INE. Authors’ calculations.
We next analyze the relationship between the organizational structure of a firm
and the skill premium. For this we extend regression (3.1) to control for the ratio of
unskilled workers to managers. We label this ratio as span of control, SC. The extended
3We get similar results if we calculate the skill premium using average hourly wage instead of average
annual wage.
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regression is as follows:
SPi,t = β0 + β1sizeit + β2SCit + αt + γind + εit,
where αt and γind are defined as in (3.1). Table 3 shows the results. We find that the
higher the number of unskilled workers per manager, the larger the difference in wage.
This supports the idea that firms where managers have a wider span of control offer a
higher compensation to managers.
Table 3: Skill Premium for Managers vs. Composition of Firm
Size 1.619∗∗∗
(0.034)
Span of control 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001)
Year fixed effects yes
Industry fixed effects yes
Number of Observations 13, 549
Adjusted R2 0.267
OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***: Significant at 1%.
Source: INE. Authors’ calculations.
These data findings motivate the structure of firms used in our model. We will focus
on the role of managers, abstracting from other types of skilled workers, since it is the
wages of managers that drive the relation between size and skill premium. Additionally,
the firm structure should explain why managers with more direct reports get paid more.
3.3 Discrete Firm Structure
To develop insight into the relationship between firm size and the skill premium paid to
managers, we develop a hierarchical model of firms that draws elements from Garicano
(2000) and Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). Briefly, a firm consists of several
layers of employees, with employees on the bottom layer representing production workers
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and employees on higher layers representing managers. Production workers complete
a number of tasks, but a fraction of their potential output is lost before their tasks
are converted into the firm’s final good. Managers on the first level above workers
receive the uncompleted tasks from the workers who report directly to them and are
able to complete a portion of them. Tasks that even a manager on the first level cannot
complete are handed to the next layer of management, and so on. A firm chooses the
number of layers of management optimally to balance the benefits of being able to solve
additional tasks against the costs of compensating the additional managers.
Figure 1(a): Examples of Firm Hierarchies
CEO
Worker Worker Worker Worker
Manager Manager
Figure 1(b)
CEO
Worker Worker Worker Worker
Manager Manager
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In our full general equilibrium model, the number of management layers chosen
by a firm is a continuous variable. We first develop intuition by presenting a simple
partial-equilibrium version of the model in which the number of management layers is
discrete.
Consider a firm with X ∈ N levels. The structure of the firm is rigid in the sense
that specific quantities of managers at each level are required. Each worker at level
x = 0 receives a measure 1 of tasks. Of those tasks, he is able to solve a share equal
to 1 − λ, and the uncompleted fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of the tasks is passed to the level
immediately above. No two employees work on the same task. Each manager in level
x > 0 is assigned R direct reports from the level immediately below and so they receive
a measure R(1 − λ) of unsolved tasks of which they are able to solve a share 1 − λ.
The unsolved fraction λ of the tasks are passed in turn to the next-highest level of
management. The quantity R is constant within a firm so that a manager above the
first management layer receives direct reports from R managers on the level immediately
below. A firm’s total output is the number of tasks its workers and managers are
collectively able to solve. (In the next section, a firm’s output will be a function of the
number of tasks completed.)
We refer to R as the span of control of the firm. We denote employees at the lowest
level (x = 0), who receive no reports, as workers, while employees on higher levels are
managers. We will denote managers at the highest level as CEO’s and we assume that
every firm has one CEO. Figure 1 displays the case where R = 2 for firms with X = 1
and X = 2.
Each firm chooses the optimal number of levels of management X. Hiring additional
levels of management allows more tasks to be solved in exchange for a larger wage bill.
Specifically, a firm with X levels hires RX−x managers at level x > 0 and RX workers.
Furthermore, it is able to solve RX(1 − λX+1) tasks. Lemma 1 states and proves this
result.
Lemma 1. Consider a firm with X levels and span of control R. Each manager in
level x ∈ {1, . . . , X} solves a measure (Rλ)x(1− λ) of tasks. The total measure of tasks
completed by the firm is RX(1− λX+1).
Proof. See B.1.
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Notice that if Rλ > 1 then the contribution of managers is increasing in the level
of management x. Assume that wages of all employees - both workers and managers -
are proportional to the number of tasks they complete (as they will be in the general
equilibrium version of the model). Define the skill premium of a firm, SPX,R, as the
ratio of the average wage of managers to the average wage of workers. Then SPX,R can
be expressed as
SPX,R =
∑X
x=1R
X−x(Rλ)x(1− λ)∑X
x=1R
X−x ×
1
1− λ
=
λ
1− λ(R− 1)
RX
RX − 1(1− λ
X),
where the first term is the average contribution of managers and the second is the inverse
of the average contribution of workers. Lemma 2 demonstrates that the skill premium
is increasing in both levels of management and span of control.
Lemma 2. If Rλ > 1 then SPX+1,R > SPX,R and SPX,R+1 > SPX,R.
Proof. See B.1.
The assumption Rλ > 1 implies that each manager completes more tasks than each
of her direct reports individually. The lemma establishes two results central to the
theme of our paper for the simple, discrete version of the model. The skill premium
increases in firm size (proxied by X) because larger firms have top managers who receive
many reports (both direct and indirect) and are therefore able to complete many tasks.
On average, then, managers at large firms receive higher wages than managers at small
firms. The second part of the lemma results from the fact that managers who receive
more direct reports have the opportunity to solve more tasks that employees at lower
levels were unable to complete.
3.4 Continuous Firm Structure
We now extend the firm structure to allow for a flexible (continuous) selection of both
levels and measure of employees. Consider a firm with X levels and span of control R.
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To maintain consistency between the discrete version of the model and the continuous
version, we assume a width one of CEOs. The span of control R determines the width of
managers at level x to be RX−x. Let manager n ∈ [0, RX−x−1] in level x be a manager
who occupies a space of width one with lower edge equal to n. We define the “area of
command” for manager n located on level x > 0 to be the set of workers and managers
who either report directly to manager n or report to a manager within the area of
command for manager n. Manager n is in charge of dealing with the unsolved tasks of
everyone within her area of command. Formally, the area of command of manager n on
level x > 0, AC(x, n), is defined as
AC(x, n) ≡
{
(x′, n′) : x′ ∈ [0, x) , nRx−x′ < n′ ≤ (n+ 1)Rx−x′
}
.
To map the concept of area of command to the discrete case, consider a firm with 2
levels and span of control R = 3. The area of command of manager n = 1 on level
x = 1 is all workers at the bottom level located strictly above position 3 (= nRx) and
below position 6 (= (n + 1)Rx). Figure 2 illustrates an area of command. Lemma 3
characterizes the measure of employees in AC(x, n).
Lemma 3. There is a continuum of measure 1lnR(R
x − 1) of employees in area of
command AC(x, n).
Proof. The measure of managers in AC(x, n) is given by∫
(x′,n′)∈AC(x,n)
dx′dn′ =
1
lnR
(Rx − 1)
Corollary 1. Assume that there is a measure 1 of CEOs. Then there is a measure
RX−1
lnR of managers in a firm with X levels and span of control R.
Notice that the measure of employees in an area of command doesn’t depend on
the location of manager n on level x. Therefore, without loss of generality, we’ll denote
areas of command and the tasks solved within them by the level of the manager. That
is, the area of command of a manager in floor x will be denoted by AC(x).
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Similar to before, every employee is able to solve a measure 1 − λ of the tasks she
is assigned. The remaining fraction is sent to a manager located in a higher level.
As before, the measure of tasks each employee is able to solve is independent of the
tasks any other employee can solve. Now, the number of reports that a manager in
level x gets from employees in level x−∆ is equal to R∆. Intuitively, as we transition
from the discrete to continuous case, levels come closer together and each manager gets
less reports from the level directly below them, but there are more levels below them.
Additionally, they are able to solve only a fraction (1 − λ)∆ of the tasks they receive.
Proposition 3 characterizes the number of tasks that are solved in the area of command
AC(x).
Figure 2: Area of Command
0
1
X
RX
x
nRx
(n+ 1)Rx
Proposition 3. Suppose each worker receives a measure one of tasks. Let T (x) be the
number of tasks that are solved in the area of command AC(x). Then
T (x) = Rx
(
1− e−x(1−λ)
)
.
Proof. See B.1.
Corollary 2. Assume that there is a measure 1 of CEOs. Then the total number of
tasks solved by a firm with X levels and R reports is RX(1− e−X(1−λ)).
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Now, the area of command of a manager in level x, AC(x), receives a measure Rx
of tasks to be solved. From Proposition 3, the total measure of tasks solved within this
area of command is Rx
(
1− e−x(1−λ)), so there is a measure of Rx−Rx (1− e−x(1−λ)) =
Rxe−x(1−λ) of unsolved tasks that a manager at floor x faces. Of this measure she is
able to solve a fraction 1−λ. Therefore the marginal contribution of a manager at level
x, MCx is given by
MCx ≡ Rxe−x(1−λ)(1− λ). (3.2)
3.5 General Equilibrium Model
We now embed the structure introduced in Section 3.4 in a general equilibrium frame-
work with consumers, firms and an education sector. Consumers supply labor inelasti-
cally and choose a quantity of education. The education a consumer receives determines
the level of a firm the consumer is qualified to work at and the wage he receives. Con-
sumers use their labor income to pay for education and the consumption good. Only by
receiving education can an individual work as a manager. Firms operate a technology
that converts completed tasks into the final good with heterogeneous productivities,
and they choose an optimal number of levels of management, which in our model is
equivalent to choosing the size of the firm. The education sector employs educators and
is competitive.
3.5.1 Consumers
There is a measure L of consumers. All consumers are identical at the beginning of each
period and own an equal share of all firms. Consumers choose whether to work in the
education sector or the private sector by comparing the utility received from working in
the education sector, VE , with the utility received from working in the private sector,
VP .
In order to obtain competence in educating others, educators require hE < 1 units of
instruction from other educators. Educators supply instruction in the education sector
inelastically and receive a wage of wE . The budget constraint for an educator is
cE + wEhE = wE +
Π
L
.
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This implies that the utility an educator receives is
VE ≡ u
(
wE(1− hE) + Π
L
)
,
where Π denotes the total profits across all firms and u(·) is the utility function.
Consumers in the private sector choose a level of education x. The quantity x also
signifies the level at which the consumer is able to manage at a firm. For example,
an individual with a level of education x = 1 can work at the first (lowest) level of
management. The amount of time required for an educator to train a consumer to work
at level x is denoted by h(x). Formally, the problem of a consumer in the private sector
is:
VP ≡max
x
u(c)
s.t. c+ wEh(x) = w(x) +
Π
L
(3.3)
Since all consumers are ex-ante identical, it must be the case that consumers are
indifferent between all choices in their optimal set. If we assume that there exists an xE
such that the level of education required to work at level xE is equivalent to the level
of education required to become an educator (i.e. h(xE) = hE), then the indifference
requirement immediately implies that wE = w(xE). This allows us to simplify the
consumer’s problem to be (3.3) since VE is given by the utility obtained from choosing
xE .
Notice that in order to educate a manager to level x we require h(x) units of educator
time. Further, each of those educators requires hE units of educator time, and those
educators also need hE units of educators time, and so on. Therefore the total time
required in order to train a manager to level x is
h(x) + h(x)hE + (h(x)hE)hE + · · · = h(x)
∞∑
n=0
hnE =
h(x)
1− hE .
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3.5.2 Firms
The homogeneous final good is produced by a continuum of firms. A firm whose em-
ployees complete T total tasks produces the final good using technology Y (T , z). We
make basic regularity assumptions on Y ; namely, YT > 0, YT T < 0, Yz > 0, and Y (T , z)
satisfies Inada conditions on T . Firms have idiosyncratic technology parameters z dis-
tributed according to the density function f(·). Given z, the firm chooses a number of
employee levels X in order to maximize profits. The structure of the firm is rigid in the
sense that a firm with X levels must employ RX−x employees at each level x ∈ [0, X] at
the firm. In this sense, the firm faces a modified Leontief production function for which
the proportions of employees hired at each level are fixed. Workers and managers are
able to complete tasks as outlined in Section 3.4. Let T (X) denote the number of tasks
completed by a firm with X levels.4 Profits for firms are given by
pi(z) = max
X
Y (T (X), z)−
∫
x
w(x)l(x,X)dx
s.t. l(x,X) = RX−x. (3.4)
Total profits across all firms are then Π =
∫
z pi(z)f(z)dz.
3.5.3 Relation to the Standard Model with Human Capital
At its core, our model is a model with human capital or education with the added
restriction that firms hire specific ratios of workers across levels of education. Instead
of being perfectly substitutable in production, imposing a structural hierarchy upon
firms turns employees with varying levels of education into complements. Two workers
cannot simply replace a manager but must work in conjunction with managers in order
to accomplish additional tasks. Larger firms require more layers and ultimately a higher
average level of human capital. Consequently, they pay a higher average wage.
3.5.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a function which maps education levels to wages, w : X → R+, and
a function which maps firm technology endowments to an optimal number of levels for
4Recall that T (X) = RX
(
1− e−X(1−λ)
)
; see the Corollary to Proposition 3.
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the firm, X∗ : Z → R+, such that:
1. X∗ solves the firm’s problem (3.4);
2. consumers are indifferent between any education level which is employed with
positive measure;
3. the total labor market clears∫
z
∫
x
l(x,X∗(z))
(
1 +
h(x)
1− hE
)
f(z)dxdz = L;
4. the goods market clears∫
z
Y (T (X∗(z)), z)f(z)dz =
∫
x 6=xE
c(x)g(x)dx+MEc(xE),
where
ME ≡
∫
z
∫
x
l(x,X∗(z))
h(x)
1− hE f(z)dxdz
g(x) ≡ 1
L
∫
z
l(x,X∗(z))f(z)dz.
3.5.5 Solving the Equilibrium
We make assumptions about the functional form of h(x) and the firm structure in order
to obtain an analytical solution to the model.
Assumption 1.
h(x) = (Rxe−x(1−λ) − 1)(1− hE)
Assumption 2. The span of control is sufficiently wide, specifically:
lnR > 1− λ
We denote by w0 the wage rate for an unskilled worker on the bottom level of a
firm, who has received no education. By equilibrium condition 2 above we know that
consumers must be indifferent between obtaining any education level which is employed
with positive measure. This implies that w(x) = wEh(x) + w0. Assumption 1, the
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marginal productivity of a worker at level x from equation (3.2) and the fact that
wE =
w0
1−hE imply that the marginal wage bill for completing an additional task is
constant and equal to w01−λ . Therefore w0 is sufficient for characterizing the entire wage
schedule.
Now, due to the rigid nature of the firm’s structure and Assumption 2 on the span
of control R of the firm, the mapping from X to T is monotonic and we can simplify
the firm’s problem to choosing the optimal number of tasks to be solved. Proposition 4
formally states and proves this.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the firm’s problem becomes:
max
T
Y (T , z)− w0T . (3.5)
Proof. See Appendix.
This immediately implies that a firm with a higher technology parameter z will
solve more tasks. Since tasks are monotonically increasing in the number of levels,
it is also straightforward that the number of levels in a firm is increasing in z. The
continuous case offers an analytical advantage over the discrete case since solutions do
not depend on cutoff values for z. The continuity in selection of tasks along z allows us
to demonstrate the existence of the equilibrium which we formalize with Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then an equilibrium exists.
Proof. See B.1.
Corollary 3. If Y (T , z) = zT α, then
T ∗(z) =
(
αz
w0
) 1
1−α
for each z and
w0 = α
E
[
z
1
1−α
]
L(1− λ)
1−α
clears the labor market.
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3.5.6 Skill Premium
The model can help us understand the effects of firm size and structure on skill premium.
We first develop the notion of a skill premium within the model. Similar to section 3.3,
we define the skill premium for a firm with X levels and span of control R to be the
ratio of the average wage for managers to the wage for workers; that is,
SP (X,R) ≡
∫
x>0w(x)l(x,X)dx/
∫
x>0 l(x,X)dx
w0
.
This aligns well with the definition we use in the data where skill premium is defined as
the ratio of average wages for managers to average wages of blue collar workers. Using
this definition of skill premium, we are able to show that skill premium is increasing in
the size of the firm.
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, ∂SP∂X > 0.
Proof. See B.1.
Next, we show that the skill premium is increasing in the span of control of the firm.
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 1, ∂SP∂R > 0.
Proof. See B.1.
In our model, there is a monotonic relationship between the size of firms and the
number of levels the firm employs. Therefore, Lemma 4 aligns with our first empirical
observation, namely, that skill premium is increasing with size. This is a direct result
of the fact that managers at higher levels have a higher marginal productivity than
managers at lower levels and workers. As more levels are added, the average productivity
of managers increases and since the productivity per worker is constant in size, the result
is obtained.
The intuition for our second result is similar. The number of tasks passing through
a manager in a given level is increasing in the number of his direct reports. As the
manager’s span of control increases so does his marginal contribution to the firm. In
our model this directly correlates to the manager’s compensation due to our educational
structure, thus our second result 5. This result can be generalized by relaxing our
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assumption on education and adding consumer heterogeneity. In any model where
marginal contribution and wages are positively related a similar result will hold. This is
also consistent with the second fact we observe in the data, namely, that skill premium
is increasing in the ratio of workers per manager.
3.6 Conclusion
In this essay we use recent data from the Chilean Manufacturing Survey to document
that, consistent with previous findings, skill premium is positively related with the size
of firms. We exploit the rich information we have on different types of skilled workers
to estimate the relationship between skill premia by worker type and size. We find that
the effect of size on skill premium is much greater for managers than for technicians.
From this we conclude that the organizational structure of the firm is important in
explaining the positive relationship between size and skill premium. Further findings
on the positive correlation between the ratio of workers to managers and skill premium
suggest that span of control plays a key role in a firm’s organizational structure.
We build on the discrete structural models in the literature a` la Garicano (2000)
and Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) by developing a simple continuous version of
the model which maps higher levels of management to higher levels of human capital.
The model allows for a closed form analytical solution and provides comparative statics
which make specific predictions about the affects of organizational structure on its wage
structure; namely, the two facts in the data outlined above.
Chapter 4
Market Structure, Innovation,
and Allocative Efficiency
4.1 Introduction
In this essay, I develop a model to study how firm technological upgrading decisions
affect allocative efficiency in a multi-industry environment where market concentration
differs across industries. I find that for a range of empirically relevant numerical sim-
ulations, technological upgrading increases the allocative inefficiency that results from
differences in market power across industries. Firms in industries with a low number of
producers and high market concentration do not upgrade their productive technology,
while firms in more competitive industries do. As a result, resources shift away from
industries that are already producing too few goods relative to the socially optimal
level. Allocative inefficiency increases. The main result of the essay, then, is once that
firm upgrading decisions are taken into account, the efficiency losses from differences in
market concentration become even larger.
Empirical work suggests that there is an “inverse-U” relationship between market
concentration and firm innovations (Aghion et al. 2009). Competition promotes inno-
vative efforts, but only up to a point: Firms in highly competitive industries have little
to gain from productivity improvements since there are few rents to be had. To my
knowledge, the model developed here is the first to capture the inverse-U relationship
in a general equilibrium setting. The advantage of developing a general equilibrium
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model is that it allows me to perform welfare analysis and study how firm innovation
decisions affect allocative efficiency. Reksulak et al (2008) come to the conclusion that
innovations made by monopolists reduce welfare, arguing that when a monopolist raises
productivity, the difference between a monopoly’s actual output and the socially op-
timal level increases. My model implies the opposite, which is that welfare ought to
increase when a monopoly raises its productivity. The difference between my paper and
theirs largely arises from the fact that their analysis is partial equilibrium, and the fact
that I find a result that is the opposite of theirs underscores the importance of studying
welfare in a general equilibrium setting. The paper most similar to mine is Aghion et
al (2009). The authors develop an inverse-U model of competition and innovation in a
partial equilibrium environment, but they do not seek to study welfare.
The model I study captures, broadly, the same economic forces that govern innova-
tion decisions in the Aghion et al. model. In my model, there are many industries, and
the exogenously-given number of producers varies across industries. Each industry has
a leading firm that is able to upgrade its technology and produce at a lower unit cost
than its competitors. The inverse-U relationship arises from two countervailing forces.
First, as the number of producers in an industry increases, rents for each producer fall
as each producers market share shrinks and the price is driven down closer to firms
marginal costs. When rents are low, the benefit of raising productivity falls, all else
equal, leading to less technological upgrading. Competition also has a positive effect
on upgrading, though. In highly competitive markets where firms each have small mar-
ket shares, the potential gains from having a productivity advantage over rival firms
is potentially large. By raising productivity, one firm can improve its market share
substantially, which represents a strong incentive to upgrade. This is similar to the
“escape from competition” motive present in Aghion et al. Monopolists, by contrast,
do not face the same incentive because they capture the entire market whether or not
they upgrade. When the two forces combine, there is an inverse-U relationship between
market concentration and innovation.
The inverse-U relationship represents a middle ground between the Schumpeterian
and Arrow views of competition and innovation. The Schumpeterian view (Schumpeter
1942) emphasizes the need for a firm to be able to earn rents in order to have an incentive
to invest in technological improvements. Firms with substantial market power should be
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driving innovation, then. The Arrow view (Arrow 1962), which has comparatively more
evidence in its favor1, is that product market competition fosters innovation. Under
certain parameterizations, a firms gains from upgrading are strictly increasing in the
competitiveness of an industry (measured by the number of producers in the industry).
While I do not focus on this case, the effects of upgrading on allocative efficiency are
somewhat stronger than in the baseline inverse-U case.
The question of how firms’ innovations affect allocative inefficiency is not just of the-
oretical interest. According to Sidak and Teece (2009), “[F]ederal courts have...caused
antitrust case law to ossify around a decidedly static view of antitrust.” Many, including
the authors, have argued that antitrust law should take a more dynamic view of the com-
petitive environment and consider how breaking up a monopoly would affect innovation
in a particular industry. The discussion is typically framed as a question of weighing
static allocative efficiency against dynamic technical efficiency. That is, monopoly may
result in allocative inefficiency today, but investments in innovation made by monop-
olists lead to productivity that is closer to the socially optimal level. (These studies
- mostly but not always - seem to lean toward a Schumpeterian view of innovation in
which firms with extensive market power are making the major innovations.) The mes-
sage of my essay is that today’s market structure also affects allocative efficiency in the
future through its effect on firm innovations. A better understanding of the linkages
between competition, innovation, and efficiency can inform discussions about public
interest in the context of antitrust law.
The remainder of the essay proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents the equilibrium
model. Section 4.3 presents the corresponding social planner problem. In Section 4.4,
I conduct welfare analysis and compare the welfare losses in my baseline model to a
version of the model with no upgrading. I show that the welfare losses stemming from
allocative inefficiency are larger in the baseline model for a range of parameterizations.
Section 4.5 concludes.
1See Holmes and Schmitz (2010) for a review of the evidence.
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4.2 Model
I develop a multi-industry general equilibrium model in which industries are distin-
guished by their competitiveness (in terms of the number of producers). In each industry
there is a leader who can push the industry’s technological frontier outward by paying a
fixed cost, along with potentially many other “follower” producers. Whether or not the
leader upgrades depends on the number of other producers in the industry. The pattern
of upgrading exhibits an inverse-U pattern in the sense that leaders in industries with
intermediate levels of competition have the strongest incentives to upgrade.
4.2.1 Preferences
There is a representative agent of unit mass who has linear preferences over a final good
c. The final good is a CES aggregate of differentiated products indexed by j:
c =
(∫ 1
0
q(j)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between products. By standard arguments, the
inverse demand for a particular product is given by:
p(j) = P
( c
q(j)
) 1
σ
(4.1)
where p(j) is the price of product j, q(j) is the quantity of the product, and P is the
ideal price index defined as:
P ≡
(∫ 1
0
p(j)1−σdj
) 1
1−σ
4.2.2 Production
In each industry j there are n(j) firms, n(j) ∈ [1,∞). Since industries are only distin-
guished by the number of competitors in them, I will from now on index an industry by
n instead of j. Preferences can therefore be rewritten as:
c =
(∫ ∞
1
q(n)
σ−1
σ df(n)
) σ
σ−1
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where f(n) is the desnity of industries with n producers.
Each firm produces an identical version of product n, and firms are Cournot com-
petitors. The number of producers in an industry is given exogenously, and making n
endogenous (for example, by having firms pay a fixed entry cost) would not substantially
change the results. Firms use a linear labor technology with idiosyncratic productiv-
ity zi(n), where i indexes an individual firm in industry n. The representative agent
supplies one unit of aggregate labor inelastically. I designate labor as the numeraire
commdity, so the wage is equal to 1 throughout. In each industry, there is a single
“leader” that produces with productivity γz and n − 1 “followers” that produce with
productivity z, where γ > 1. I assume z is constant across industries. I will generally -
though not always - carry the term z throughout the exposition, but I set z = 1 without
loss of generality.
Before production takes place, followers can attempt (costlessly) to imitate the
leader’s technology. With probablility p, they succeed. For now I focus on the case
p = 1, so that all followers can produce with productivity γz. What distinguishes the
leader from the followers is that the leader has the opportunity to upgrade its produc-
tivity to γ2z by paying a fixed cost f , denominated in units of the final good. Followers
cannot imitate the new, upgraded technology. The leader will upgrade if
piI(n)− f ≥ piN (n)
where piI(n) are the leader’s variable profits if it upgrades and piN (n) are the leader’s
variable profits if it does not.
4.2.3 Profit maximization problems
If the leader does not upgrade, all n firms in the industry produce with productivity γ.
Each producer’s profit maximization problem is
Max p(n)qi(n)− qi(n)
γz
s.t.
p(n) = Pc
1
σ
( n∑
i=1
qi(n)
)− 1
σ
qi(n) ≥ 0
q−i(n) given
69
Throughout, I will focus on symmetric Cournot equilibria when all producers in an
industry have the same productivity. Solving for the equilibrium is routine, so I omit
the details. The price in industry n when the leader does not upgrade is given by:
p(n) =
( σn
σn− 1
)( 1
γz
)
(4.2)
When it does not upgrade, the leader’s profits, piN (n), are the same as profits earned
by all other firms in the industry. They are given by:
piN (n) = P σc
( 1
n
)( 1
σn− 1
)
(γz)σ−1 (4.3)
Note that when n = 1, the price is the familiar monopoly price, which is a constant
markup σ/(σ − 1) times marginal cost. Profits are also equal to the corresponding
monopoly profits. Meanwhile, as n→∞ (which corresponds to the perfectly competi-
tive case), the price approaches firms’ marginal cost and profits approach zero.
When the leader upgrades, the problem is similar, but now the leader produces with
productivity γ2 while all firms have productivity γ. A follower’s profit-maximization
problem is the same as the one above, and the leader’s profits maximization problem is:
Max p(n)qi(n)− qi(n)
γ2z
s.t.
p(n) = Pc
1
σ
( n∑
i=1
qi(n)
)− 1
σ
Since firms are no longer symmetric, the equilibrium will not be symmetric. Instead, I
will consider equilibria in which all followers produce the same quantity. The leader will
produce a larger quantity. There are two cases to consider. First, when γ ≥ σ/(σ − 1),
the leader captures the entire market and the followers produce nothing. What this
condition says is that the leader’s productivity advantage over its competitors (the
left side of the inequality) is greater than the monopoly markup (the right side of the
inequality). When the inequality holds, the leader is able to set a price equal to the
monopoly markup over its own marginal cost, and that price will still be below the
followers’ marginal costs. Hence the followers produce zero. When γ < σ/(σ − 1), all
producers in the industry produce a positive quantity. The expressions below summarize
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the price charged in the industry.
p(n) =

(σ[γ(n− 1) + 1]
σn− 1
)( 1
γ2z
)
, if γ < σ/(σ − 1).( σ
σ − 1
)( 1
γ2z
)
, otherwise.
(4.4)
For the case n = 1, note that the leader charges the monopoly price in either case. For
the perfectly competitive case n → ∞ in which followers produce non-zero quantities,
the price converges to the followers’ marginal cost:
lim
n→∞ p(n) =
1
γz
In this case, the difference between the followers’ marginal cost and the leader’s marginal
cost represents the leader’s per-unit profit.
4.2.4 Upgrading decisions
The difference between piI(n) and piN (n) measures how strong the leader’s incentive to
upgrade is. In Figure 1, I plot piI(n)− piN (n) as a function of n. The parameters used
to create the graph (see Table 1) were not chosen in any systematic way, but many
reasonable parameterizations produce a figure that looks qualitatively similar.
As the figure shows, there is an inverse-U relationship between market concentration
and a leader’s incentive to upgrade. Depending on the value of f , there are three
outcomes. For f sufficiently low, every leader upgrades. For f sufficiently high, no one
upgrades. For intermediate f , we see more economically interesting behavior. Figure 1
illustrates innovative behavior for two different fixed costs, f1 and f2. For the higher of
the two costs, f1, only leaders facing an intermediate amount of competition choose to
upgrade. Neither the monopolists nor the leaders in highly competitive industries have
a strong enough incentive to pay the fixed cost.
Table 1: Parameterization for Figure 1
Parameter Value
σ 3.5
γ 1.2
z 1
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There is another economically interesting case when f = f2. In it, f2 is such that
leaders in all but the least competitive industries upgrade. One can show for this case
that as n approaches infinity, the difference piI(n) − piN (n) decreases asymptotically
toward a value greater than piI(1) − piN (1). The level of f2 depicted in Figure 1 could
be thought of as capturing the “Arrow view” of competition and innovation, in which
the industries with the most innovation are those that are the most competitive. Note,
Figure 1: Gains from upgrading
though, by modeling the upgrading cost as a fixed cost, I am unable to capture any
differences in the intensity of innovation among the most competitive industries. If there
were a variable component to the level and cost of upgrading, Figure 1 suggests that
the intensity of upgrading efforts would be greatest for industries with intermediate n,
in which piI(n)− piN (n) is the greatest.
The inverse-U shape of the piI(n)−piN (n) function results from two competing forces.
The first is that as the number of competitors increases, the rents that the leader can
earn fall as the leader’s market share falls and the industry price is driven down closer
to the leader’s marginal cost.2 When rents fall, so do the gains from upgrading, all else
2Note that if the leader upgrades, the price will converge to the followers’ marginal cost for large n,
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equal. This is the familiar Schumpeterian effect of competition on innovation, and it
can be seen in the decreasing portion of piI − piN .
There is another effect at work, though, similar to what Aghion et al (2009) call the
“escape from competition” effect. In a highly competitive industry, gaining a productive
advantage over one’s competitors can result in a large increase in market share. The
gains from upgrading, then, are potentially large when n is high. This can be seen most
starkly for the case γ ≥ σ/(σ − 1). Recall that when γ is greater than the monopoly
mark-up, a leader that upgrades can set the monopoly price and capture the entire
market for the industry’s product. A leader that does not upgrade, though, will have
the same productivity as the followers. Since the Cournot equilibrium is symmetric,
the leader’s market share is equal to (1/n). A monopolist, by already controlling the
industry, stands to gain no market share by upgrading. On the other hand, a leader in
a highly competitive industry with large n can go from having a miniscule market share
to becoming a monopolist by upgrading. The “escape from competition” effect suggests
that greater competition leads to greater innovative activity, and this can be seen in the
upward-sloping portion of piI − piN . While γ ≥ σ/(σ − 1) (so that the leader captures
the entire market by upgrading) is an extreme case of the model, it is a useful one for
illustrative purposes. The combination of the escape-from-competition effect and the
Schumpeterian effect leads to the hump shape of piI − piN .3
4.3 Aggregation and equilibrium
Firm quantities are aggregated as follows. First, let pii(n) denote the variable profits
earned by firm i operating in industry n, before the fixed cost of upgrading (if applicable)
is deducted. Total variable industry profits pi(n) are given by:
pi(n) =
n∑
i=1
pii(n) (4.5)
and not the leader’s marginal cost. But it will be closer to the leader’s marginal cost than it would have
been for small n, though. See equation Section 2.3.
3Aghion et al (2009) use the phrase “escape from competition” in a slightly different sense from the
way I use it. In their model, there are two producers, and the intensity of competition is related to
how close the two producers’ productivities are to each other. Upgrading helps one firm separate itself
from the other. In my model, by contrast, the number of firms in the industry proxies for the industry’s
competitiveness.
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Aggregate variable profits pi then consists of the total amount of variable industry profits:
pi =
∫ ∞
1
pi(n)df(n) (4.6)
With a labor supply equal to 1 and labor as the numeraire commodity, total labor
income is equal to 1. Total income in the economy is the sum of labor income and
aggregate profits, less upgrading costs. To account for the fixed costs that leaders pay
to upgrade, I introduce an indicator function x(·) : [1,∞) 7→ {0, 1} that takes on value
1 if the leader in industry n ≥ 1 decides to upgrade, and zero otherwise. The total fixed
cost paid by all firms, F , is given by:4
F =
∫ ∞
1
x(n)fdf(n)
The goods market clearing condition requires that total income be equal to total ex-
penditures:
Pc = 1 + pi − F (4.7)
Let `i(n) denote the labor demanded by firm i in industry n. The total industry demand
for labor, `(n), is given by:
`(n) =
n∑
i=1
`i(n)
Labor market clearing requires that the total labor demand be equal to the total labor
supply:
∫ ∞
1
`(n)df(n) = 1 (4.8)
4.3.1 Definition of equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of prices p(·), quantities qi(·), labor demands `i(·), and an
indicator function for upgrading decisions x(·) such that:
1. Given P , c, and x(·), qi(n) solves the profit-maximization problem of firm i in
industry n, and `i(n) is the associated labor demand;
4I have not yet demonstrated that x(·) is integrable, but throughout this paper it will be.
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2. For each industry n, p(n) is given by the inverse demand function (1);
3. For each industry n, x(n) maximizes the profits of the industry n leader:
max
x(n)∈{0,1}
x(n)(piI(n)− f) + (1− x(n))piN (n)
4. The goods maret clearing condition (7) holds.
By Walras’ Law, the labor market clearing condition is redundant.
The equilibrium of the model will not in general be unique. A leader’s upgrading
decision depends on aggregate quantities, which in turn depend on the upgrading de-
cisions of leaders in other industries. Because upgrading involves paying a fixed cost
to gain a discrete jump in productivity, many patterns of upgrading are possible across
industries. Throughout this paper, I make the natural assumption that the equilibrium
that holds is the one in which only the leaders with the strongest incentive to upgrade
do so (if any firms upgrade at all). Formally, consider two industries n1 and n2. I
consider equilibria in which for any n1 and n2, the following condition holds:
piI(n1)− piN (n1) > piI(n2)− piN (n2)⇒ x(n1) ≥ x(n2) (4.9)
In other words, if the leader in industry n1 has more to gain by upgrading than the
leader in industry n2, I will not consider equilibria in which the leader in n2 upgrades
but the leader in industry n1 does not.
4.4 Social planner problem
To quantify the losses from allocative inefficiency in the benchmark model, we need
to compare the equilibrium welfare to the welfare that arises from the social planner
problem. I take real consumption, c, as the appropriate welfare measure. Denote by
cE the equilibrium welfare. Because of monopoly distortions, it will be lower than the
social planner welfare, which I denote by cSP .
The social planner must first make the upgrading decision x(n) for the leader in each
industry. Then, given the new distribution of productivities, the social planner chooses
the welfare-maximizing output for each firm. The planner’s problem can be solved in
75
two steps. First, suppose that the planner has chosen to upgrade the technology of a
fraction µ of all firms. Since all leading firms have the same initial productivity γz,
the social planner will treat them as if they are identical. If the leader’s technology
is upgraded, then it will have a productivity advantage over the follower firms. And
because the technology is linear, it will be the only active producer in the industry. If
the leader’s technology is not upgraded, then the pattern of production across firms
within the industry is indeterminate. Since the total industry output will be known,
we can assume that the leader produces the entire industry’s output for the purposes
of computing welfare. So whether or not a leader’s technology is upgraded, we can
treat each industry as if the leader is the only producer in the industry. Given µ, I
compute the welfare-maximizing production level for each firm. Denote the maximized
level of welfare by cSP (µ). In the second step, the planner chooses the value µ∗ that
maximizes cSP (µ). Welfare under the efficient social planner allocation is then given by
cSP = cSP (µ∗).
The following assumption makes it easy to obtain an analytical solution to the
social planner’s problem but is not critical for the qualitative points being made. I will
maintain it for the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 1. σ = 2.
For Step 1 of the social planner’s problem, take µ as given. Given µ, the social
planner chooses quantities that solve the following welfare maximization problem5
Max
(∫ 1
0
q(j)(
σ−1
σ
)dj
)( σ
σ−1 )
s.t.∫ µ
0
( 1
γ2
)
q(j)dj +
∫ 1
µ
(1
γ
)
q(j)dj + µf ≤ 1
The constraint is the resource constraint on labor, which is in unit supply. Solving the
above problem is straightforward, and one can show that the resulting welfare is given
by
cSP (µ) = γ
(
1− µf)[µ(γ − 1) + 1] (4.10)
5Note that in this section I am reverting to the original notation in which industries are indexed by
j. I do so because the leader is now the only active producer in each industry, so n does not matter.
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The second step of the social planner’s problem is to choose the welfare-maximizing
level of µ:
max
µ∈[0,1]
cSP (µ) = γ
(
1− µf)[µ(γ − 1) + 1]
The above problem will have an interior solution iff the following two conditions hold:
(a) γ > 1 + f , (b) γ < 1 +
f
1− 2f
If (a) is violated, then µ∗ = 0. If (b) is violated, then µ∗ = 1. If neither is violated, then
the solution is interior and given by
µ∗ =
γ − 1− f
2f(γ − 1) (4.11)
What the above conditions say is that when the fixed cost, f , is small relative to the
productivity gain γ, it is optimal for the planner to upgrade the technology of all firms.
When the fixed cost is sufficiently large relative to γ, it is optimal for there to be
no upgrading. For an intermediate range of f , it is optimal to have only some firms
upgrade.
4.5 Allocative inefficiency
In the model, losses from allocative inefficiency result from the fact that firms’ market
power differs across industries. The central question of this section is: To what extent
do firm innovation decisions amplify or attenuate distortions from firms having different
market power? As I will show, upgrading amplifies losses from allocative efficiency. For
example, when leaders in all but the least competitive industries upgrade (see Figure
2), upgrading increases the losses from allocative inefficiency because leaders in more
competitive industries produce more efficiently and draw resources away from industries
that are already producing too few goods relative to the social optimum.
I use the ratio of equilibrium welfare to social planner welfare to define a measure
of allocative inefficiency, denoted by Wloss:
Wloss = 1− c
E
cSP
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Table 2: Parameterization for Figure 2
Parameter Value
σ 2
γ 1.01
z 1
For a particular set of parameters, I compute Wloss in the baseline model and com-
pare it to the value of Wloss that arises in a version of the model in which firms do
not have the opportunity to make investments in productivity growth. For the no-
upgrading version of the model, Wloss is computed the same way as above, except now
both cE and cSP are computed in a version of the model with no upgrading. If Wloss is
higher in the no-upgrading model than in the baseline model, then upgrading mitigates
monopoly distortions. If Wloss is higher in the no-upgrading model, then upgrading
amplifies monopoly distortions.
The main exercise I will do will be to allow f to vary while holding all other
Figure 2: Wloss ratio as a function of f
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parameters fixed. The fixed parameters are given in Table 2. I have chosen values of f
which ensure that only firms with an intermediate number of producers upgrade, thus
mimicking the inverse-U relationship between competition and innovation. I assume
that the number of competitors in an industry, n, is uniformly distributed on the interval
[1,20].
Figure 2 shows the main results of the paper. The vertical axis measures the ratio of
Wloss in the model with upgrading to Wloss in the version of the model in which there
is no upgrading. (Note that the former depends on f while the latter does not, since
upgrading is not allowed in the latter model.) What the figure shows is that the relative
losses from allocative efficiency are larger when leaders are allowed to upgrade.
Moreover, the differences in Wloss between the two models are largest for low val-
ues of f . When f is low, many leaders upgrade, drawing many resources away from
less-competitive, non-upgrading industries that are already producing below the social
optimum. For values of f at the low range of the interval I consider, the relative losses
from allocative inefficiency are over twice as large as in the no-upgrading version of the
Figure 3: Fraction of leaders that upgrade
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model. When f is high, fewer leaders upgrade, and the pull of resources away from
uncompetitive industries is less strong. The relative losses from allocative inefficiency
are then lower. Figure 3 shows how the fraction of leaders that upgrade declines as f
increases.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that technological upgrading decisions can increase distortions in
environments where the level of competition differs across industries. The model I de-
velop is well-suited to study the welfare implications because it captures the empirically
observed inverse-U relationship between competition and innovation in a general equi-
librium setting. In the numerical simulations I perform, differences in upgrading across
firms amplify distortions arising from differences in market concerntration across indus-
tries by a factor of 2. Monopolists’ low propensity to innovate is a well-known cost
of monopoly in that they forego opportunities to produce at lower unit costs when it
would be socially optimal for them to do so. My paper identifies an additional source of
loss beyond monopolists’ low productivity per se: Firms in more competitive industries
draw resources away from low-competition industries, causing output in low-competition
industries to fall further below the social optimum.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 1.
Given sH and sL, the manager’s problem is
ρ∗(sH , sL) = max
ρ∈[0,1]
ρsHpiH + (1− ρ)sLpiL −Azσ−1exp(bρ) + λzσ−1
Throughout I will consider only interior solutions to the manager’s problem. For appro-
priate choices of A and b the solution will be strictly between 0 and 1. The manager’s
problem is strictly concave in ρ, so the optimal choice of ρ, ρ∗(sH , sL), solves the first-
order condition from the manager’s problem:
sHpiH − sLpiL −Abzσ−1exp(bρ) = 0 (A.1)
Rearranging this gives
ρ∗(sH , sL) =
(1
b
)
log
[( 1
Ab
)
z1−σ(sHpiH − sLpiL)
]
(A.2)
The owners’ problem can now be written as
max
sh,sL
ρ∗(sH , sL)[(1− sH)piH ] + (1− ρ∗(sh, sL))[(1− sL)piL]
s.t.
sH ≥ 0
sL ≥ 0
84
85
sH ≤ 1
sL ≤ 1
ρ∗(sH , sL)sHpiH + (1− ρ∗(sH , sL))sLpiL − e(ρ∗, z) + λzσ−1 ≥ wh
ρ∗(sH , sL) =
(1
b
)
log
[( 1
Ab
)
z1−σ(sHpiH − sLpiL)
]
To prove the first part of Proposition 1, that sL = 0, I need the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Under the optimal contract, (1− sH)piH ≥ (1− sL)piL.
Proof. Let s = (sH , sL) be an optimal contract. Suppose, to show a contradiction, that
(1−sH)piH < (1−sL)piL. Now consider an alternate contract s¯ = (sH−, sL), where  is
small. To show the contradiction, it suffices to show that owners have higher expected
income under the contract s¯. Denote by W (s) the expected income that owners receive
under contract s. Subtracting the owners’ expected income under s¯ from the owners’
income under s gives
W (s)−W (s¯) = ρ∗(s)(1− sH)piH + (1− ρ∗(s))(1− sL)piL − ρ∗(s¯)(1− sH + )piH
+ (1− ρ∗(s¯))(1− sL)piL
= (ρ∗(s)− ρ∗(s¯))
[
(1− sH)piH − (1− sL)piL
]
− ρ∗(s¯)piH
< 0.
It is immediate from the expression for ρ∗ in (23) that ρ∗(s) − ρ∗(s¯) > 0. And by
assumption, (1− sH)piH − (1− sL)piL < 0. The inequality in the third line then follows.
Since W (s) −W (s¯) < 0, s cannot be an optimal contract, so there is a contradiction
and the lemma is proved.
Now I am in a position to prove that the manager’s limited-liability constraint sL ≥ 0
binds in the low-profit state. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that s = (sH , sL) is
an optimal contract and that sL > 0. To show that this cannot be an optimal contract,
I show that the contract s¯ = (sH , sL − ) offers higher expected value to the owners,
where  is small. The difference in the owners’ expected value between the two contracts
is
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W (s)−W (s¯) = ρ∗(s)(1− sH)piH + (1− ρ∗(s))(1− sL)piL − ρ∗(s¯)(1− sH)piH
+ (1− ρ∗(s¯))(1− sL + )piL
= (ρ∗(s)− ρ∗(s¯))
[
(1− sH)piH − (1− sL)piL
]
− ρ∗(s¯)piL
< 0.
From the expression for ρ∗ in (23), we see that (ρ∗(s) − ρ∗(s¯)). And from Lemma 1,
we have that (1 − sH)piH ≥ (1 − sL)piL. The inequality in line 3 then follows. With
W (s)−W (s¯) < 0, the contradiction is shown, and therefore the optimal contract must
have sL = 0.
To establish part (2) of Proposition 1, consider once more the owners’ maximization
problem. The first-order Kuhn-Tucker condition with respect to sH is
1
b
( piH
sHpiH − sLpiL
)
[(1− sH)piH − (1− sL)piL]− 1
b
log
[( 1
Ab
)
z1−σ(sHpiH − sLpiL)
]
piH
+µM (H)− µO(H) = 0
where µM (H) is the multiplier on the limited-liability constraint sH ≥ 0 and µO(H)
is the multiplier on the owners’ limited-liability constraint sH ≤ 1. The fact that the
owners’ limited-liability constraint does not bind is established in the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Under the optimal contract, the limited-liability constraint on owners does
not bind in the high-profit state. That is, sH < 1.
Proof. It has already been established that an optimal contract has sL = 0. The proof
follows from the fact that the contract s¯ = (1− , 0) offers the owners greater expected
value than the contract s = (1, 0). Showing this is straightforward.
Having established that sH < 1 under the optimal contract, there are two cases left
to consider. The first is when the manager’s limited-liability constraint on sH does not
bind. In this case, the optimal sH solves equation (26), with µM (H) and µO(H) set
equal to zero. (This follows from the complementary slackness conditions.) The solution
is the value of s∗ given in part (2) of Proposition 1. If s∗ < 0, then the limited-liability
constraint binds and sH = 0. Hence, under the optimal contract, sH = max{s∗, 0}.
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Part (3) of Proposition (2) follows from subsituting sH = max{s∗, 0} and sL = 0 into
(23).
Proof of Proposition 2.
For a struggling firm, the manager’s problem is
ρ∗(sH) = max
ρ∈[0,1]
ρsHpiH + ρλz
σ−1 −Azσ−1exp(bρ)
The maximization problem is concave in ρ, so (ignoring corner solutions) the manager’s
optimal choice of ρ will satisfy the first-order condition
sHpiH + λz
σ−1 −Abzσ−1exp(bρ) = 0 (A.3)
Rearranging this gives the manager’s optimal choice of ρ:
ρ∗(sH) =
(1
b
)
log
[( 1
Ab
)
z1−σ(sHpiH + λzσ−1)
]
(A.4)
With the above expression for ρ∗ in hand, the owners’ problem can be written as
max
sH
ρ∗(sH)[(1− sH)piH ]
s.t.
sH ≥ 0
sH ≤ 1
ρ∗(sH)[sHpiH + λzσ−1]−Azσ−1exp(bρ) ≥ wh
ρ∗(sH) =
(1
b
)
log
[( 1
Ab
)
z1−σ(sHpiH + λzσ−1)
]
By assumption, the participation constraint does not bind, so we can ignore it. Also,
by an argument parallel to the one in the proof to Proposition 1, one can show that
the limited-liability constraint on owners does not bind. We can therefore ignore this
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constraint going forward as well. The first-order Kuhn-Tucker condition for the owners’
problem is
1
b
( piH
sHpiH + λzσ−1
)
(1−sH)piH− 1
b
log
[( 1
Ab
)
z1−σ(sHpiH +λzσ−1)
]
+µM (H) = 0 (A.5)
where µM (H) is the multiplier on the manager’s limited-liability constraint in the high-
profit state. If the limited-liability constraint does not bind, then by the complementary
slackness condition the optimal choice of sH solves equation (29) with µM (H) set to
0. If the limited-liability constraint does bind, then it is immediate that sH = 0. This
completes the proof of part (1) of Proposition 2. Part (2) comes from substituting the
value of sH found in part (1) into equation (28).
The case where the participation constraint binds
In this section, I characterize the optimal contract between a manager and firm
owners when the participation constraint binds. Struggling firms are the easiest to
analyze and will be considered first. I then turn to thriving firms.
Struggling firms
Since profits in the low-productivity state are zero, the contract is a one-dimensional
object which only specifies the share of profits that a manager receives in the high state.
When the participation constraint binds, we have
ρ∗(sH)(sHpiH + λzσ−1)−Azσ−1exp(bρ∗(sH)) = wh (A.6)
The left-hand side of this equation is strictly increasing in sH , so there is a unique value
of sH that satisfies it. If the above equality holds for some sH > 1, then no contract
can be formed (the owners’ limited-liability constraint is violated) and the firm exits.
Note that when the participation constraint binds, the manager receives a larger share of
profits than she otherwise would if the participation constraint did not bind. As a result,
the manager exerts more effort when the participation constraint binds. This is another
mechanism through which increased competition can raise productivity in the model.
Lower tariffs erode profits for domestic firms, causing the participation constraint to
bind for some of them: The share of profits that the manager had previously been
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receiving is no longer sufficient to satisfy the participation constraint. As a result, the
managers receive a larger share of profits and work harder to raise productivity.
Thriving firms
The following proposition summarizes the contract received by the manager of a
thriving firm whose participation constraint binds.
Proposition 6. Suppose a firm with productivity z is thriving and that the manager’s
participation constraint binds. Let s¯ be defined so that (1− s¯)piH = piL. Also, let s∗ be
the solution to
ρ∗(s∗, 0)s∗piH − e(z, ρ∗(s∗, 0)) + λzσ−1 = wh
The manager’s contract is then summarized as follows:
(1) If 0 ≤ s∗ < s¯, then the owners choose the contract (sH , sL) = (s∗, 0).
(2) If 1 ≥ s∗ ≥ s¯, then the owners choose the unique contract (sH , sL) such that:
(1− sH)piH = (1− sL)piL
ρ∗(sH , sL)sHpiH − (1− ρ(sH , sL))sLpiL − e(z, ρ∗(sH , sL)) + λzσ−1 = wh
A formal proof is available upon request. Here I just provide an intuitive explanation.
To satisfy the manager’s participation constraint, the owners must give payments to
managers larger than those specified in Proposition 1. The owners will first pay the
manager a larger share of the profits when productivity is high than they would if they
were not constrained, and keep sL = 0. The reason is that, as long as sH is not too
high, the owners receive more income in the high-profit state than in the low-profit
state. They therefore want to give the manager strong incentives to exert effort. Doing
so entails punishing the manager as much as possible in the low-profit state by setting
sL = 0. The value of sH (given sL = 0) that satisfies the manager’s particpation
constraint with equality is given by s∗.
However, if the value of sH required to satisfy the participation constraint (given
sL = 0) is too high, then manager extracts all of the surplus from the productivity gains,
and then some. When (1−sH)piH < piL, the owners would prefer that the manager exert
no effort at all. Once all of the surplus from the productivity gains has been extracted
by the manager, the owners choose the contract that sets (1 − sH)piH = (1 − sL)piL
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and satisfies the manager’s participation constraint with equality. Any other contract
would mean that the manager’s payments are highest in the state in which the owners’
payments are the lowest. (If sHpiH > sLpiL, then (1 − sH)piH < (1 − sL)piL, and vice
versa.) As a result, the incentive structure will encourage the manager to try to attain
the state that the owners least prefer, which cannot be optimal.
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Table A1: Industry Trade-Orientation Classifications
Trade Orientation ISIC code Industry Name
321 Textiles
351 Industrial chemicals
355 Rubber products
361 Pottery, china, earthenware
362 Glass products
Import-competing 381 Fabricated metal products
382 Machinery, excl. electrical
383 Machinery, electric
384 Transport equipment
385 Professional and scientific equipment
390 Other manufactured products
311 Food products
313 Beverages
314 Tobacco
322 Wearing apparel, excl. footwear
323 Leather products
324 Footwear, excl. rubber or plastic
Non-traded 332 Furniture, excl. metal
342 Printing and publishing
352 Other chemicals
353 Petroleum refineries
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products
356 Plastic products
369 Other non-metallic mineral products
371 Iron and steel
331 Wood products, excl. furniture
Export-oriented 341 Paper and products
372 Non-ferrous metals
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Select Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We will first prove by induction on x that each manager at level x > 0 is able to
solve (Rλ)x(1 − λ) tasks. Consider first the measure of tasks that workers solve: by
assumption each worker receives a measure one of tasks of which he is unable to solve
a fraction λ which he passes on to managers in level x = 1. Now, each manager at
level x = 1 receives R direct reports. Therefore each manager at level x = 1 receives a
measure Rλ of tasks, out of which they solve a fraction 1−λ and passes on the remaining
to managers at level x = 2.
Consider a manager at level x and assume that he solves a measure (Rλ)x(1 − λ)
of tasks. A manager at level x+ 1 receives R direct reports, each of which passes on a
measure λ(Rλ)x of unsolved tasks. Of this measure he is able to solve a fraction 1− λ.
This implies that (Rλ)x+1(1− λ).
Since there are RX−x managers in level x, the total number of tasks TX is given by
TX =
X∑
x=0
RX−x(Rλ)x(1− λ)
= RX(1− λX+1).
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B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
First we will prove that SPX+1,R > SPX,R. For this it is sufficient to prove that
RX+1
RX+1 − 1(1− λ
X+1) >
RX
RX − 1(1− λ
X),
which is equivalent to proving that
R
∑X
x=0 λ
x∑X−1
x=0 λ
x
>
∑X
x=0R
x∑X−1
x=0 R
x
. (B.1)
(B.1) holds if and only if
R
(
X−1∑
x=0
Rx
)(
X∑
x=0
λx
)
>
(
X∑
x=0
Rx
)(
X−1∑
x=0
λx
)
⇐⇒ λX
X−1∑
x=1
Rx >
X−1∑
x=0
λx
⇐⇒
X−1∑
x=0
λx (Rλ)X−x >
X−1∑
x=0
λx. (B.2)
Since Rλ > 1, λx on the left hand side of (B.2) is multiplied by a term greater than one
for all x ∈ {0, . . . , X − 1}. Therefore the left hand side is strictly greater than the right
hand side and the proof follows.
Now we prove that SPX,R+1 > SPX,R. For this it is sufficient to prove that
R
(R+ 1)X
(R+ 1)X − 1 > (R− 1)
RX
RX − 1 ,
which is equivalent to proving that
R(RX − 1)(R+ 1)X > (R− 1)RX((R+ 1)X − 1). (B.3)
(B.3) holds if and only if
(RX −R)(R+ 1)X + (RX+1 −RX) > 0,
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which holds if R > 1. Notice that Rλ > 1 and λ ∈ (0, 1) imply R > 1, which completes
the proof.
B.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We will prove the result by first considering levels of width ∆ and calculating by induc-
tion the total number of tasks solved in AC(x) as ∆→ 0. In each level x′ ∈ [0, x] of area
of command AC(x) there are Rx−x′ employees. Workers in AC(x, n) receive a measure
1 of tasks and are able to solve a fraction ∆(1 − λ) of them. Each manager in level ∆
receives R∆(1 − ∆(1 − λ)) tasks and is able to solve a fraction ∆(1 − λ). Since there
is a measure Rx−∆ of managers at level ∆, the total measure of tasks that managers
at level ∆ solve is Rx(1 − ∆(1 − λ))∆(1 − λ). Each employee in level 2∆ manages a
width of R∆ direct reports, each of whom passes on R∆ (1−∆(1− λ))2 unsolved tasks.
Each manager in level 2∆ is able to solve a fraction ∆(1 − λ) of those tasks. There
is a measure Rx−2∆ of managers at level 2∆, so the total measure of tasks that these
managers solve is Rx(1−∆(1− λ))2∆(1− λ).
Now assume that managers at level i∆ solve a measure Ri∆(1−∆(1− λ))i∆(1− λ)
of tasks. There are Rx−i∆ managers at this level. So the total measure of tasks solved
by managers at this level is Rx(1−∆(1−λ))i∆(1−λ). Each employee at level (i+ 1)∆
manages a width of R∆ direct reports, each of whom passes on Ri∆ (1−∆(1− λ))i+1
unsolved tasks. Each manager in level (i + 1)∆ is able to solve a fraction ∆(1 − λ) of
those tasks. Since there are Rx−(i+1)∆ managers at level i + 1, the total measure of
tasks solved by these managers is Rx(1 − ∆(1 − λ))i+1∆(1 − λ). Therefore the total
measure of tasks solved in area of command AC(x) is
T (x) ≡ lim
∆→0
(1− λ)Rx∆
b x∆c∑
i=0
(1−∆(1− λ))i
= lim
∆→0
Rx(1− (1−∆(1− λ))b x∆c+1)
= Rx
(
1− e−x(1−λ)
)
,
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where the last line is due to the fact that
lim
∆→0
x
∆
ln (1−∆(1− λ)) = −x(1− λ).
B.1.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Recall from Proposition 3 that the number of tasks a firm solves is given by T (X) =
RX
(
1− e−X(1−λ)). Equilibrium condition 2 requires that consumers be indifferent
between obtaining any education levels which are employed with positive measure.
This implies that w(x) = wEh(x) + w. Now, for an educator it must hold that
wE = wEhE + w, so wE =
w
1−hE . Therefore
w(x) =
w
1− hE h(x) + w. (B.4)
Plugging (B.4) and the labor requirements at each level into the firm’s problem we
get:
max
X
Y (T (X), z)−
∫
x
RX−x
(
w
1− hE h(x) + w
)
dx
= max
X
Y (T (X), z)−RX
∫
x
we−x(1−λ)dx
= max
X
Y (T (X), z)− wT (X), (B.5)
where the second line is a consequence of Assumption 1.
Assumption 2 on the span of control implies that T (X) is strictly increasing in X.1
Therefore (B.5) is equivalent to
max
T
Y (T , z)− wT .
B.1.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 4 implies that the solution to (3.5) is sufficient to derive a function X∗ :
Z → R+ that satisfies the equilibrium conditions given wages.
1T ′(X) = RX
(
lnR− e−X(1−λ) (lnR− (1− λ))
)
. Since lnR > 1− λ, 1− λ > 0 and e−X(1−λ) < 1,
then T ′(X) > 0.
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Denote by T ∗(z, w) the solution to (3.5). The regularity conditions on Y (T , w) imply
that T ∗(z, w) is strictly decreasing in w, limw→∞ T ∗(z, w) = 0 and limw→0 T ∗(z, w) =
∞ since T ∗(z, w) satisfies
YT (T ∗(z, w), z) = w.
Denote by X∗(z, w) the value of X that achieves T ∗(z, w). Notice that X∗(z, w) is also
strictly decreasing in w. Let
H(w) ≡
∫
z
∫
x
l(x,X∗(z, w))
(
1 +
h(x)
1− hE
)
f(z)dxdz
=
∫
z
∫
x
RX
∗(z,w)−xRxe−x(1−λ)f(z)dxdz
=
1
1− λ
∫
z
T ∗(z, w)f(z)dz.
Then the regularity conditions on Y (T , w) imply that H(w) is strictly decreasing in w,
limw→∞H(w) = 0 and limw→0H(w) = ∞. Since the labor market clearing condition
implies L = H(w), the result follows.
B.1.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Plugging in h(x) from Assumption 1 and the definition of l(x,X) we get
SP (X) = lnR
1
1− λ
RX
RX − 1(1− e
−X(1−λ)).
Consider
g(X) ≡ R
X
RX − 1(1− e
−X(1−λ)).
It is sufficient to prove that g′(X) > 0. Now
g′(X) =
RX
e(1−λ)X(RX − 1)2
(
(1− λ)(RX − 1)− lnR
(
eX(1−λ) − 1
))
.
It is sufficient to prove that ĝ(X) ≡ (1 − λ)(RX − 1) − lnR (eX(1−λ) − 1) > 0 for all
X > 0. First notice that ĝ(0) = 0. Now,
ĝ′(X) = (1− λ) lnR
(
RX − eX(1−λ)
)
,
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so lnR > 1− λ implies that ĝ′(X) > 0.
B.1.7 Proof of Lemma 5
Plugging in h(x) from Assumption 1 and the definition of l(x,X) we get
SP (X) = lnR
1
1− λ
RX
RX − 1(1− e
−X(1−λ)).
Let g(R) = lnR R
X
RX−1 . It is sufficient to prove that g
′(R) > 0. Now
g′(R) =
RX−1
(RX − 1)2
(
RX − 1− lnRX) .
Since x− 1 > lnx for any x > 0, the result follows.
